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Nature aesthetics is examined as an approach to environmental ethics. The 
characteristics of proper nature appreciation show that every landscape can be 
appreciated impartially in light of the dynamic processes of nature. However, it is often 
claimed that natural beauty decreases if humans interfere with nature. This claim leads to 
the separation of human culture and nature, and limits the number of landscapes which 
can be protected in terms of aesthetic value. As a solution to this separation, a non-
dualistic Japanese aesthetics is examined as a basis for the achievement of the 
coexistence of culture and nature. Ecological interrelationships between human culture 
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Aesthetics and Ethics 
In order to contribute to the solution of contemporary environmental issues, 
environmental ethicists have tried to improve our attitudes toward nature in terms of 
discussing human values and perspectives. Philosophical questionings of the relationship 
between humans and nature have developed in diverse ways. Nature aesthetics is one of 
these philosophical approaches to environmental ethics. Thus, its aim is not to judge 
degrees of beauty in environments, but rather to provide a justification for developing 
ecological attitudes in light of the aesthetic value of environments. 
Aesthetics is not only theoretical but also practical. Generally, if someone thinks 
something is aesthetically valuable, he or she tries to protect it. The aesthetic 
consciousness directly influences human behavior without reasoning. This insight-
oriented approach may be considered irrational (or nonrational), and thus, weak as a 
ground for environmental ethics. However, if it is correct that there is a close connection 
between aesthetic feeling and human behavior, aesthetics is promising as an approach to 
environmental ethics. 
The close connection of aesthetics and ethics is discussed by G. E. Moore in 
Principia Ethica. A bare recognition of beauty in the object is not the only element of 
aesthetic appreciation. Some kind of feeling and emotion is included in the proper 
appreciation of beautiful objects. Moore points out that when cognitive elements of 
beauty in the object and aesthetic emotions are combined, highly valuable wholes can be 
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formed. He writes, “all of these [aesthetic] emotions are essential elements in great 
positive goods; they are parts of organic wholes, which have great intrinsic value.”1 
Furthermore, according to Moore, aesthetic enjoyments can be recognized not as 
subjective judgments, which are valuable because of the goodness of individuals, but as a 
means to enhancing ethical behavior and social progress toward goodness as a whole. For 
this reason, Moore writes that aesthetic feeling is “the ultimate fundamental truth of 
Moral Philosophy.”2 I believe that Moore’s remark is correct. Aesthetics is not simply the 
discussion of subjective enjoyments. It is also a promising approach to raising ethical 
consciousness. As such, I believe nature aesthetics is one of the most influential 
approaches to environmental ethics. 
 
Nature Aesthetics and Eastern Philosophy 
Generally, the main focus of the study of aesthetics is art. Aesthetic objects and 
paradigms (what and how to appreciate art) have been discussed in relation to works of 
art. Nevertheless, when we see things in the world, we perceive some sort of feeling or 
thoughts toward them. If we realize aesthetics as a broader judgment about tastes with 
regard to things, anything in the world can be the object of aesthetics. Nevertheless, not 
everything can be judged under the same aesthetic paradigms. Nature aesthetics is not the 
aesthetics of art but of nature; thus, it requires different aesthetic paradigms from those of 
art. Accordingly, we need to develop appropriate standards of the judgment of beauty in 
nature. 
                                                           
1 G. E. Moore, Principia Ethica (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1965), p. 190. 
2 Ibid., p. 189. 
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Allen Carlson is one of the most important figures in the field of nature aesthetics. 
He focuses not only on natural environments but also on other environments, including 
urban and rural environments. Carlson calls this broader subject environmental aesthetics. 
His book, Aesthetics and the Environment: The Appreciation of Nature, Art and 
Architecture, is a great source for understanding various aspects of environmental 
aesthetics.3 In the introduction to this book, he discusses the differences between 
aesthetic objects in art and the environment. The significant difference between them is 
that the former is framed, while the latter is not. Unlike art, environments are not 
bounded either spatially or temporally. Moreover, natural environments do not have 
either a designer or a design. According to Carlson, “the appreciation [of environments] 
must be fashioned anew, with neither the aid of frames, the guidance of designs, nor the 
direction of designers.”4 What concepts do we need, in particular, for achieving nature 
aesthetics?  
I develop this basic argument of nature appreciation in chapter one. In light of the 
advancement in nature appreciation in Western culture, I examine what qualities in nature 
should be aesthetically appreciated. This examination indicates that natural science has 
contributed to the development of nature aesthetics. Nonetheless, it is still possible to 
achieve proper appreciation of nature without depending on scientific information. At the 
end of chapter one, I introduce an alternative approach to nature aesthetics. 
In chapter two, I focus on the concept of beauty per se. Beauty can be perceived 
differently depending on the ontological characterization of aesthetic value. Two major 
                                                           
3 Allen Carlson, Aesthetics and the Environment: The Appreciation of Nature, Art and 
Architecture (New York: Routledge, 2000). 
4 Ibid., xviii. 
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approaches are value subjectivism and value objectivism. The former think that beauty is 
in mind of subjective being. Contrary, the latter approach shows that beauty exists 
objectively in the world. Depending on our perception of beauty, we encounter different 
problems. Perhaps there is not a single answer for the definition of ontological 
characteristics of beauty; yet, I explore the most appropriate understanding of beauty for 
the achievement of environmental ethics. 
It is often claimed that Eastern philosophy contains more helpful guides to nature 
aesthetics than Western philosophy. For instance, Japanese people have been 
significantly sensitive to natural beauty; accordingly, Japanese religio-cultural notions are 
full of expressions of nature. Nature has been adopted as a motif of various art styles. In 
Japanese art, nature has been appreciated in light of aesthetic paradigms which work as 
bases for nature aesthetics. Nevertheless, in spite of its potential to contribute to the 
development of nature aesthetics, natural beauty based on Japanese traditional thoughts 
has not been discussed fully. Thus, I explore the possibility of the contribution of the 
Japanese tradition to nature aesthetics in terms of examining traditional Japanese value of 
nature and comparing it with the aesthetic paradigm of nature. 
It is not possible to discuss all aspects of Japanese value of nature in this essay 
because this value has been developed as a result of the fusion of diverse indigenous and 
foreign religions and cultures. As a helpful approach to understanding metaphysical and 
epistemological notions of nature, I develop the discussion of Japanese value of nature 
from etymological analysis of Japanese words for nature in chapter three. Some 
important notions of the value of nature and of the relationship between humans and 
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nature are disclosed through this etymological analysis. In terms of this analysis, I discuss 
whether the Japanese view of nature is helpful as a basis for environmental ethics. 
As a conclusion to this essay, I examine the implications of Japanese gardens in 
chapter four. Gardens are products of the natural and the artificial. Because art and nature 
depend on different aesthetic paradigms, there is a potential for aesthetic conflicts when 
appreciating gardens. These conflicts may be overcome in light of the harmonious 
relationship between art and nature. In some gardens, art serves as a model for nature; in 
others, nature serves as a model for art. Either type of garden overcomes aesthetic 
conflicts in terms of one of two aesthetic paradigms, a nature paradigm or an artistic 
paradigm. Japanese gardens are classified into neither of these two types of gardens. 
They are included in gardens based on the dialectical relationship between art and nature, 
which are generally difficult to aesthetically appreciate. Nonetheless, most people do not 
have difficulties when appreciating Japanese gardens. How, then, do Japanese gardens 
overcome aesthetic conflicts? I begin by developing an answer for this question following 
upon Carlson’s suggestion that Japanese gardens solve the problem of aesthetic judgment 
by the achievement of uncovering the essence of nature. I then approach nature aesthetics 
in terms of discussing characteristics of the essence of nature and ways to uncover the 




THE PROPER APPRECIATION OF NATURAL BEAUTY  
The Picturesque Beauty of Nature 
The beautiful scenery of nature attracts many people’s attention. It is an important 
factor for human activities such as city planning, recreation, and art. However, nature has 
often been conceived negatively in Western countries. Originally, symmetry and 
geometrical features were the chief characteristics used to describe beauty.5 As a result, 
irregularity in nature was not attractive to Western people. The preference for regular 
forms was closely associated with a Christian understanding of the world based on 
biblical texts. Nature’s irregularity, complexity, and dynamism were believed to be a 
symbol of God’s wrath. The interpretation of the world in terms of the Judeo-Christian 
accounts restricted positive appreciations to works of God. Greatness and vastness were 
attributes of Deity rather than of landscape.6 However, because of the development of 
natural history science, people began to expand their understanding of the world. Such 
conceptions as majesty, grandeur, and vastness, which involve both admiration and awe, 
began to be used to describe not only God but also Space and Nature.7 Nature’s 
characteristics, which were negatively perceived, began to be aesthetically appreciated in 
terms of the aesthetics of the sublime. This significant shift in people’s perceptions of 
                                                           
5 This tendency is repeated in Marjorie Hope Nicolson, Mountain Gloom and Mountain Glory 
(University of Washington Press, 1997). 
6 Ibid., p. 75. 
7 Ibid., p. 143. 
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beauty can be examined through poetry, painting, and various artistic works in relation to 
seventeenth-century science.  
For example, Marjorie Hope Nicolson documents changes in people’s perceptions 
of mountains in her book, Mountain Gloom and Mountain Glory. In the Judeo-Christian 
tradition, irregularity in nature was believed to be caused after the Fall because of human 
sin. People did not have a positive image of irregular shapes in nature. Nature without 
geometrical structure was not considered to be aesthetically appreciable. For example, 
Thomas Burnet says, “the earth as it first appeared must have been ‘smooth, regular and 
uniform, without Mountains and without a Sea.”8 For Burnet, mountains and oceans are 
negative factors that detract from the beauty of the world. Furthermore, he desires a 
regular pattern of the basin holding of the sea and writes, “If the Sea had been drawn 
round the Earth in regular Figures and Borders, it might have been a great Beauty to our 
Globe.”9 From the contemporary standpoint, regular forms in nature inhibit the 
dynamism of nature; however, in the traditional Western culture, people had different 
aesthetics values and were not attracted to nature as dynamic. Nevertheless, Burnet 
himself began to notice the new emotions inspired by the grandeur of nature when he 
traveled in mountainous areas.10  
The large shift in Western people’s perceptions of nature was caused by scientific 
discoveries in the seventeenth century. One of the significant discoveries was the 
existence of mountains on the moon, which afforded new arguments about mountains on 
                                                           
8 Ibid., p. 203. 
9 Ibid., p. 211. 
10 Ibid., p. 215. 
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Earth.11 Astronomy played an important role in establishing a new concept of majestic 
nature. The vastness of the cosmos introduced the concept of infinity into the Christian 
understanding of the world. For example, the concept of infinite space has contributed to 
a change in the interpretation of creation stories. The six “days” of Creation was 
reinterpreted as the six “millenniums” of Creation.12 This reinterpretation enhanced the 
understanding of the formation of the Earth; yet millenniums were still not a sufficient 
geologic span. Moreover, one came to think that “The cosmos created to infinity and 
eternity by a God of Plentitude must be infinitely filled with every sort of variety and 
diversity.”13 For example, Henry More, a Cartesian philosopher, discovered the new 
aesthetics of nature and “rejoiced in every aspect of its richness, fullness, diversity, 
variety” in the Divine Dialogues.14 Diversity also became a positive characteristic of 
nature. Because of the development of astronomy, geology and other scientific studies, 
mountains were no longer considered to be ruins. They became a part of God’s great 
creative work.  
Eugene C. Hargrove points out, “A recognition that the world was ‘God’s work’ 
prepared the way for the aesthetic enjoyment of nature analogous to the enjoyment of art 
created by human beings.”15 People began to see aesthetic value where they had not 
recognized it before. Natural characteristics such as vastness, massiveness, chaos, and 
disharmony became aesthetically appreciable due to the growing interest in sublimity. 
                                                           
11 Ibid., p. 131. 
12 Ibid., p. 251. 
13 Ibid., p. 137. 
14 Ibid., pp. 130–140. The quotation is on p. 138. 
15 Eugene C. Hargrove, Foundations of Environmental Ethics (Denton: Environmental Ethics 




Various sorts of natural entities became the object of aesthetic appreciation. People began 
to describe the picturesque beauty of nature. For example, John Muir portrays the 
beautiful scenery in Yosemite Valley in the way: “Pursuing my lonely way down the 
valley, I turned again and again to gaze on the glorious picture, throwing up my arms to 
inclose (enclose) it as in a frame.”16 Everyone agrees that Yosemite Valley is beautiful. 
One may think that he or she wants to put its beautiful scenery in a frame. However, 
natural beauty cannot be appreciated adequately by this sort of visual appreciation. 
Beauty in nature cannot be described by the two-dimensional visual mode. Such senses as 
smell, texture, and sound need to be included in nature appreciation. Moreover, 
functional characteristics of nature also need to be included. If we merely put nature in a 
frame, much of the natural beauty will be missed.  
The appreciation of picturesque beauty has been developing; yet, the unframed 
beauty of nature has not been fully recognized. There are many natural objects or places 
which are not visually attractive; however, it does not necessarily mean that they are not 
valuable compared to visually beautiful places if we know the proper kind of appreciation 
of nature. Visual beauty is not sufficient to describe natural beauty. We need a broader 
concept of beauty in order to understand the true aesthetic value of nature. 
 
A Broader Concept of Beauty 
If a visual appreciation is not sufficient for nature aesthetics, what natural 
elements other than visual appearance can we value aesthetically? How can we expand 
                                                           
16 John Muir, “A Near View of the High Sierra,” Environmental Ethics: Divergence and 
Convergence Second Edition, ed. Richard G. Botzler and Suzan J. Armstrong (The McGraw-Hill 
Companies, Inc., 1998), p. 109. 
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aesthetic properties of nature? To achieve a proper appreciation of nature, we need to 
examine what properties of nature count as aesthetic properties and how they can be 
valued properly. First, in order to clarify aesthetic properties of nature, I examine several 
of the values in nature discussed by Holmes Rolston, Ⅲ.  
When people look at nature, they recognize various kinds of values in nature. 
Some of them are instrumental, and others are intrinsic, and some possess both 
characteristics.  Rolston, in his book Environmental Ethics, describes fourteen values 
carried by nature.17 Those values are life-support value, economic value, recreational 
value, scientific value, aesthetic value, genetic-diversity value, historical value, cultural-
symbolization value, character-building value, diversity-unity values, stability and 
spontaneity values, dialectical value, life value, and religious value. His definition of 
aesthetic value under this categorization is the value through which human experience 
can be enriched in terms of science and art.18 Both art and science focus on intrinsically 
attractive factors which go beyond everyday personal needs. Rolston states, “Sensitivities 
both in pure science and natural art help us see much further than is required by our 
pragmatic necessities.”19 Artists can help us see the beauty in nature by illustrating an 
ideal form of a natural entity, that is, a natural essence in an individual existence, 
sometimes by modifying imperfections of nature. Likewise, science makes us appreciate 
nature by abstracting biological qualities in natural things. Rolston’s understanding of 
aesthetic value is very narrow. He expands the concept of natural beauty later in his book. 
                                                           
17 Holmes Rolston, Ⅲ, Environmental Ethics (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1988), pp. 
3–27. 
18 Ibid., pp. 10–12. 




However, aesthetic value as described in the fourteen values is restricted to a narrow 
understanding of natural beauty. Beauty within this classification is still based on the 
regular and complete characteristics of objects. In his view, irregular patterns or orders 
are not aesthetically appreciated as they are. We need to include other values described 
by Rolston in aesthetic value in order to broaden the aesthetic qualities of nature further. 
Before we proceed to examining other values carried by nature, let me consider a 
fundamental problem about the characteristics of aesthetic value. The question is whether 
aesthetic value is instrumental or intrinsic. There are three types of values: 
anthropocentric instrumental value, non-anthropocentric instrumental value, and intrinsic 
value.20 Most natural values are regarded as instrumental. If natural objects are used for 
the benefit of human beings, they are anthropocentrically instrumentally valued. If they 
are valued for their functions in natural cycles, those things are valued instrumentally, but 
non-anthropocentrically. The last form of value, intrinsic value is appreciated for its own 
sake without any instrumental purposes. If we describe aesthetic value based on human 
aesthetic experience and its influences on enhancing human pleasure, the beauty of nature 
can be valued under the category of anthropocentric instrumental value. In fact, it sounds 
possible to develop an anthropocentric argument for environmental preservation stating 
                                                           
20 The definition of the term anthropocentric is vague. Because of the ambiguity of this term, 
intrinsic value also can be described with such terms as anthropocentric and non-anthropocentric. For 
example, Hargrove proposes anthropocentric intrinsic value. He regards “anthropocentric” as a description 
of the position of valuers. According to his definition, any value created by human beings is regarded as 
anthropocentric (a human value). On the other hand, J. Baird Callicott and Rolston advocate non-
anthropocentric intrinsic value in terms of describing the object of valuing. According to their accounts, if 
we value for the sake of non-anthropocentric beings or things, value can be non-anthropocentric. However, 
Callicott’s and Rolston’s positions are not the same because Callicott’s non-anthropocentric intrinsic value 
is anthropogenic (created by humans) but focused on a nonhuman object, while Rolston’s non-
anthropocentric value exists externally independent of the existence of valuer (a subjective being). Rolston 




that preserving something beautiful is good because beautiful things instrumentally 
increase pleasure among people. One may think that he or she can promote 
environmental protection for aesthetic experiences of future generations. However, the 
focus of environmental ethics should not be to find anthropocentric instrumental 
justifications for promoting environmental attitudes, for such justifications could be used 
to destroy nature if humans become extinct. Moreover, imposing instrumental value on 
aesthetic objects and experiences may cause the problem of aesthetic consumption. 
Hargrove explains: 
If the object, viewed instrumentally, is damaged by tourists trying to create 
aesthetic experiences in their minds by exposing themselves to the object, the 
object becomes expendable and is consumed by the efforts to create these mental 
states or feelings.21 
 
Natural objects may be neglected if we focus on human aesthetic experiences as 
instrumental triggers for intrinsically valued human pleasure. In this way, anthropocentric 
instrumental aesthetic arguments can lead to environmental destruction when the viewing 
that creates the value instrumentally slowly destroys it. Therefore, in this essay, I focus 
on aesthetic value which can be appreciated intrinsically (for itself), not as a means to 
something else. 
Among the fourteen values described by Rolston, there are six values which can 
be appreciated from a non-anthropocentric standpoint, either instrumentally or 
intrinsically. These values are life-support value, genetic-diversity value, historical (in 
particular, natural historical) value, diversity-unity values, stability and spontaneity value, 
and life value. All of them except natural historical value and life value, by which 
                                                           
21 Hargrove, Foundations of Environmental Ethics, p. 127. 
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Rolston means intrinsic value of life, are also anthropocentric instrumental values; 
however, they can also be used in non-anthropocentric instrumental and intrinsic 
arguments.  
First, let me focus on life-support value. This value designates natural forces 
which sustain all kinds of life forms. It includes the interrelatedness among organisms, 
biochemical reactions, geologic features, climates, and so forth. These forces, in 
Rolston’s words, are “ecological values,” and are necessary for the sustenance of human 
existence. At the same time, we can suppose that they were valuable even before the 
appearance of human beings. Therefore, life-support value can be appreciated for more 
than its anthropocentric instrumental value. Likewise, genetic-diversity value, diversity-
unity value, and stability and spontaneity value can be valued positively independent of 
anthropocentric considerations.  
Genetic-diversity value began to be highlighted as a great resource of the 
economy with the development of the biotech industry. Genetic information about 
various kinds of organisms has been patented as if it were human properties. In terms of 
anthropogenic manipulations of genes for maximizing or improving the potential of 
genetic functions, it has been believed that greater genetic value can be bestowed on 
organisms. However, as Rolston points out, recognizing economic value in genetic 
material and its products is possible “because humans tap in to capture and redirect some 
form of value already there…. There is a kind of genetic richness located in organisms in 
ecosystems, and genetic-diversity value is a puzzling hybrid between human economic 
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values and values inlaid biologically in life itself.”22 These biologically inherent values 
are closely associated with natural historical value. Genetic diversity is a product of 
evolutionary history over a long period of time assuming that the theory of evolution is 
the correct interpretation of natural history. It is possible to find economic value in it; 
however, it is still valuable as it is independent of any economic value ascribed to it. 
As explained previously, the diversity and the unity of nature were not always 
fully appreciated in Western culture. Due to the shift in our world views as a result of 
scientific developments in the seventeenth century, people confronted the diversity and 
the interrelatedness of nature, and obtained new knowledge of the world. If they only 
noticed the diversity, they might have falsely conceived of nature as chaotic. Nature’s 
plurality-in-unity helped us see the intelligibility of nature. However, this feature is not 
simply a contribution to our understanding of nature. Rolston states: 
The mind is a mirror of these properties [diversity and unity] in nature, and there 
is even a sense in which the mind, founded on the cerebral complexity and 
integrating capacity, is a product of nature’s tendency both to diversify and unify. 
When this mind reflects, in turn, on the natural world, it can assign value at once 
to diverse particulars and to the universal and global regularities that underlie and 
permeate these particulars.23 
 
By confronting both diversity and unity in nature, people have developed a new 
understanding of the world. Its contribution to both metaphysics and epistemology is 
undeniable. However, these qualities are inherent in nature. They can be appreciated not 
only for its contribution to expanding our knowledge about nature but also for their own 
sakes as interesting features of nature. 
                                                           
22 Rolston, Environmental Ethics, p. 13. 
23 Ibid., p. 19. 
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There are constancies and contingencies in the natural world. Natural regularities 
can be considered valuable because they are the source of natural dependability. Human 
beings and nonhuman organisms depend on these predictable characteristics of nature for 
sustaining their lives. For example, the stages of the growth of organisms are sustained by 
regular biochemical and physical reactions. Expressions of genes, the growth of cells, 
developments of nerve systems, and various sorts of reactions are ruled by certain 
principles. If there were no regular interactions, things would end up with chimerical 
forms. There could be no growth or development. Moreover, no science would be 
possible without such natural order. Scientific analysis are possible only on the 
assumption that things follow certain rules. Therefore, regularity in nature is an important 
factor both for biological functions and the construction of scientific hypotheses. 
However, the opposite value, the stochastic characteristics of nature, also cannot be 
ignored. There would be no biological progress or improvement if there were no 
contingencies. This contrary quality was valued negatively especially in Western culture 
as an unintelligible characteristic in the context of the Newtonian mechanistic view. 
Nevertheless, it enhances our understanding of nature and can be valued positively in 
terms of its openness to the unpredictable possibilities of evolution. Rolston writes: 
What the Darwinian revolution did to the Newtonian view was to find nature 
sometimes a jungle and not a clock, and many have disliked the change. 
Contingencies do put a bit of chaos into the cosmos. But you can have a sort of 
adventure in Darwin’s jungle that you cannot have in Newtonian clock. Openness 
brings risk and often misfortune, but it sometimes adds excitement. Here nature’s 
intelligibility, aesthetic beauty, dependability, and unity are checked by the 
presence of spontaneity, and this can be valued, too.24 
 
                                                           
24 Ibid., pp. 20–21. 
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The intermingling of constancy and contingency in nature is a unique and fundamental 
characteristic of nature. It sustains human life, but goes beyond anthropocentric 
necessities.  
I have shown that these values can be a step toward non-anthropocentric valuing. 
In addition to these qualities, natural historical value, which is inlaid in the dynamic 
process of nature, is intrinsically appreciable as an interesting factor in nature. The next 
question is whether these values carried by nature can be regarded as aesthetic properties 
of nature. This question can be answered by coming to understand the focus of nature 
aesthetics. Rolston explains that “we are dealing not with painting but with happenings in 
a living system, and deeper aesthetic sensibilities are required.”25 Following this 
argument, one can say that biological, chemical and physical features, and historical 
value in natural processes can be regarded as aesthetic properties if he or she values these 
qualities aesthetically with deeper sensitivities. 
Before proceeding to the next section, in which I discuss proper appreciation in 
nature aesthetics, let us consider what it means to value objects aesthetically. Our mode 
of seeing things aesthetically is called the aesthetic attitude. The definition of this attitude 
is not simple. There are various ways to define the aesthetic attitude. As a helpful guide 
to developing an appropriate attitude in nature aesthetics, I focus on the definition by 
Jerome Stolnitz.26 
Stolnitz distinguishes the aesthetic attitude from our usual attitude, what he calls 
“the attitude of ‘practical’ perception.” People often value things instrumentally for 
                                                           
25 Ibid., p. 242. 
26 Jerome Stolnitz, “The Aesthetic Attitude,” in Introductory Readings in Aesthetics, ed. John 
Hospers (New York: The Free Press, 1969), pp. 17–27. 
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fulfilling our further goals. This attitude based on anthropocentric instrumental judgments 
is “practical,” and in such an attitude, “we perceive things only as means to some goal 
which lies beyond the experience of perceiving them.”27 The practical attitude is common 
in our lives; however, people sometimes look at things simply as they are independent of 
their instrumental value. According to Stolnitz, this intrinsic valuing is the “aesthetic” 
attitude of perception: 
I will define “the aesthetic attitude” as “disinterested and sympathetic attention to 
and contemplation of any object of awareness whatever, for its own sake alone.”... 
For the aesthetic attitude, things are not to be classified or studied or judged. They 
are in themselves pleasant or exciting to look at.… To maintain the aesthetic 
attitude, we must follow the lead of the object and respond in concert with it.28 
 
In terms of the argument about environmental protection based on human 
aesthetic experiences, if Stolnirtz’s definition of the aesthetic attitude is correct, our 
attitude of looking at nature and protecting it for enhancing our pleasure is not aesthetic, 
for such attitude is not based on intrinsic valuing of nature. On the contrary, when we see 
natural objects and value their qualities (either non-anthropocentric instrumental values 
or intrinsic value) intrinsically, we see things aesthetically. 
Stolnitz insists that “no object is inherently unaesthetic.”29 Anything can become 
an aesthetic object if we contemplate it intrinsically. This suggestion is true in nature 
aesthetics as well. Every natural thing can be aesthetically appreciable, but in terms of 
different paradigms. One of the aesthetic paradigms is two-dimensional appreciation. 
Nevertheless, as I stated previously, this sort of appreciation is not proper in nature 
aesthetics. Since the purpose of nature aesthetics is protecting not only visually beautiful 
                                                           
27 Ibid., p. 18. 
28 Ibid., pp. 19–21. 
29 Ibid., p. 24. 
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landscapes but also visually unattractive things, we need to examine the proper paradigm 
of appreciating nature. 
 
Proper Nature Appreciation 
With regard to investigating the proper appreciation of nature, Carlson focuses on 
differences between appreciation of art and nature. According to Carlson, the 
appreciation of art qua art must be appreciation qua creation of an artist; therefore, art 
appreciation is considered to be artist or designer centered. An artist has some intentions 
when he or she engages in creative activities. Thus, when we appreciate an artwork, we 
appreciate not only the object itself, but also its design by an artist. Carlson calls this sort 
of appreciation “design appreciation.”30 There are some exceptions. Some styles of art, 
for example action painting, do not have initial designs; therefore, they cannot be 
appreciated in the same way as designed art works.31 However, these are not major styles 
of art. Thus, it is still possible to say that appreciation of art is design oriented. On the 
other hand, nature does not have a designer unless you believe that the world was created 
by the divine force. Even if one accepts the theistic account of the creation of the world, 
it is clearly different from the design appreciation of works of art, which is composed of 
three factors: appreciation of the initial design, the object embodying this design, and the 
individual who embodies the design in the object.32 Therefore, it is not proper to include 
appreciation of nature in design appreciation in general. Since there is no artist in the 
creation of nature, Carlson says, “the relevant forces are the forces of nature: the 
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geological, biological, and meteorological forces which produce the natural order by 
shaping not only the planet but everything that inhabits it.”33 What we can appreciate in 
nature is the natural order, which produces dynamic natural beauty. Carlson points out 
that the appreciation of nature should be order appreciation. Natural elements, which 
appear in the process of becoming, can be positively valued according to Carlson’s order 
appreciation. Therefore, all elements in nature can be appreciated impartially in terms of 
order appreciation. This appreciation leads to the concept of positive aesthetics proposed 
by Carlson, which I discuss in the next chapter.  
One can value visually ugly objects and hazardous events such as fire and 
volcanic eruptions in a positive manner. Rolston shows how positive accounts of nature 
can overcome ugliness: 
Consider how our attitudes toward fire have changed since being informed by 
ecology. Fire sanitizes and thins a forest, releasing nutrients from the humus back 
into the soil. It resets succession, opens up edging, initially destroys but 
subsequently benefits wildlife. It regenerates shade-intolerant trees. Fire is bad for 
a culture that wishes to exploit a forest or even to view it scenically this year and 
next; fire is bad for a hiker caught in the flames; but we no longer think that fire is 
bad for a forest. … It is temporarily ugly, as is the elk carcass, in that the normal 
growth trends have been halted. But the temporary upset is integral to the larger 
systemic health.34 
 
Rolston admits that there is temporal ugliness. However, this perpetual perishing is the 
beginning of creation, and “in this perpetual re-creation there is high beauty.”35 If you 
scale down and see only a part of nature, you may see ugliness. But if you should scale 
up and see the dynamic process of nature, then, you will recognize natural beauty. 
Nevertheless, if one does not have sufficient information about ecosystems, he or she 
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may fail to see beauty in nature. In order to understand the true beauty of nature, proper 
information or education concerning the natural order is necessary. Therefore, science, 
which contributes to enhancing our knowledge about nature, plays an important role in 
nature aesthetics. 
 
The Contribution of Science 
Important elements which enhance our aesthetic sense of nature lie in education 
and scientific information. L. Duane Willard points out that “the aesthetic tastes of people 
can be changed and developed through exposure and education.”36 Even if one thinks that 
particular natural objects or landscapes are not attractive, he or she will be able to 
recognize the beauty of nature by coming to understand geological or biological features, 
historical background, ecological balance, etc. Willard distinguishes these characteristics 
which can be obtained through scientific education from visual beauty, and calls them 
“nonaesthethic values.”37 However, I believe that the nonaesthetic values in Willard’s 
remarks can be aesthetically valued. For example, the interrelatedness of organisms is a 
biological fact, which enhances our understanding of nature. According to Willard, this 
feature is not aesthetic value because it is not directly associated with the beauty of visual 
appearances. However, as I discussed in the previous section, this kind of biological fact 
can be valued aesthetically because it is a part of the nature’s dynamic processes. All 
elements which enhance dynamic beauty can be included in aesthetic properties of 
nature.  
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Carlson discusses a role of science in the development of nature appreciation in 
his theory of positive aesthetics.38 Either in the case of nature or of art, the aesthetic 
appreciation requires the proper categorization of aesthetic objects; if we have some 
information about an object and understand it correctly, we can appreciate the object 
properly. For the proper categorization, the knowledge in light of natural science is 
necessary. Our response to natural beauty is different whether or not we have knowledge 
about the natural world: 
The positive aesthetic appreciation of previously abhorred landscapes, such as 
mountains and jungles, seems to have followed developments in geology and 
geography. Likewise, the positive aesthetic appreciation of previously abhorred 
life forms, such as insects and reptiles, seems to have followed developments in 
biology.39 
 
Various information concerning the creative work of nature is necessary in order 
to fully understand the aesthetics of nature. If one has some knowledge about nature, he 
or she may come to be interested in nature. Many places which are not beautiful can be 
considered to be interesting in light of proper information. This is an important 
contribution of science because one’s interests can enhance his or her empathy and 
understanding with other living organisms and natural objects. Eventually people can be 
encouraged to think that nature is aesthetically valuable.  
Hargrove shows how interest has achieved full aesthetic status by examining the 
aesthetic views of nineteenth-century scientists as revealed in their field notebooks. These 
journals show that even if some places are not beautiful in accordance with picturesque 
standards of beauty, they attracted people in terms of their scientific interest. Scientists 
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such as William H. Brewer found themselves to be aesthetically attracted by landscapes 
which were not picturesque and “outside of the realm of conventional beauty.”40 
Hargrove points out that current environmental preservationists claim interest when 
beauty is lacking in natural objects or landscapes. For example, the establishment of 
Yosemite and Yellowstone in the nineteenth century were justified primarily in terms of 
their geological, aesthetic, and biological interest.41 Such scientific interest, continues to 
play an important role in the justification of environmental protection even today.  
The close connection of the development of natural science and nature 
appreciation is also implied by Aldo Leopold. He portrays the deeper beauty of cranes 
and their habitat in his essay “Marshland Elegy”: 
Our ability to perceive quality in nature begins, as in art, with the pretty. It 
expands through successive stages of the beautiful to values as yet uncaptured by 
language. The quality of cranes lies, I think, in this higher gamut, as yet beyond 
the reach of words.… Our appreciation of the crane grows with the slow 
unraveling of earthy history. His tribe, we now know, stems out of the remote 
Eocene. The other members of the fauna in which he originated are long since 
entombed within the hills. When we hear his call we hear no mere bird. He is the 
symbol of our untamed past, of that incredible sweep of millennia which underlies 
and conditions the daily affairs of birds and men.42 
 
Aesthetic appreciation of cranes and a marshland has developed in light of such 
biological facts as the interrelatedness of flora, fauna, and geological features and their 
evolutionary history. Since natural science unravels these facts in nature, there is a 
synchronic development between science and nature aesthetics.  
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As previously stated, visual qualities of landscapes are merely superficial 
elements of nature. Natural beauty lies in the temporal and spatial dynamic movements of 
nature. In the words of Rolston, we can see aesthetic qualities in “form, structure, 
integrity, order, competence, muscular strength, endurance, dynamic movement, 
symmetry, diversity, unity, spontaneity, interdependence, lives defended or coded in 
genomes, creative and regulative power, evolutionary speciation, and so on.”43 All of 
these qualities are fundamental elements of nature appreciation. Science discloses these 
characteristics of nature and thus enhances our aesthetic consciousness toward nature. 
Natural beauty can be understood in terms of our deeper understanding of nature. Indeed, 
science, which enhances our knowledge of nature, is undoubtedly an important factor in 
nature aesthetics. 
 
The Possibility of Unscientific Approaches 
 Science has been playing an important role in a contemporary society as a means 
of conceptualizing the world. We believe that science is an objectification of the world, 
and we judge whether or not certain information is dependable in terms of scientific 
analysis. What is verified in scientific research tends to be recognized as truth, if there is 
a reasonable ground for justifying a theory. As a result, unscientific world views tend to 
be neglected, for such views are not demonstrated by scientific methods. However, the 
neglect of unscientific concepts results in insufficient accounts of the world.  
I hold that our excessive dependence on science does not provide sufficient 
approaches to nature aesthetics for the following reasons. First, science does not 
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necessarily demonstrate universal truth. As research in science continues, information 
that was once believed to be true in the past is often revealed as an incorrect 
understanding of the world. Scientific truths can vary depending on available technology. 
Second, science is not necessarily an objectification the world. Different conclusions can 
be developed depending on our focus while looking at the world. Science also requires 
some sort of subjective judgments in the process of scientific research. When we draw a 
conclusion based on scientific data, we subjectively refer to the data and develop a 
theory. Thus, science reflects the subjective view of an observer. For these reasons, I 
believe that science is only one of the ways of looking at the physical world. There are 
many other approaches to conceptualizing the world. Although the contribution of 
science to nature aesthetics is significant, we should not deny the possibility of 
developing unscientific approaches to nature aesthetics. 
Carlson proposes several models for contemporary aesthetic appreciation of 
nature.44 Among these models, “a postmodern model” and “a pluralist model” are based 
on many layers of diverse human values. According to Carlson, a postmodern model 
starts from the realization of various forms of human conceptualization and 
understanding of the world: 
The conceptual net of common-sense and scientific understanding is not the only 
one we cast over nature. There are also numerous other nets woven by human 
culture in its many forms – nets woven not only by art, but also by literature, 
folklore, religion, and myth. This realization suggests the possibility of what may 
be called a postmodern model of nature…. [On such a model,] whatever cultural 
significance nature may have acquired and that we may find in it, the rich and 
varied deposits from our art, literature, folklore, religion, and myth, would all be 
accepted as proper dimensions of our aesthetic appreciation of nature.45 
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In a postmodern model, science is simply one of the narratives describing the world. 
According to this model, all other cultural aspects of articulating the world should be 
equally considered as approaches to nature aesthetics. However, the significance of the 
influences of these human deposits varies. Carlson resolves this issue by replacing a 
postmodern model with a pluralist model, which accepts “the diversity and the richness 
of the cultural overlay,” yet recognizes that “not all of human’s cultural deposit is 
aesthetically significant either to all parts of nature or for all of humankind.”46  
Carlson’s suggestion of a pluralistic approach to nature aesthetics is quite 
important. However, Carlson’s focus does not seem to provide a justification for 
unscientific approaches to the proper appreciation of nature. At the end of the discussion 
of the pluralist model, Carlson points out that the fundamental layers of the human 
deposit, for example, those based on the senses and science, do not need to be restricted. 
Thus, he states that  
even in light of the possibility of a pluralist model, models such as the arousal 
model [a model depending on human common, everyday knowledge and 
experience of nature] and the natural environmental model [a model depending on 
scientific understanding] maintain a special place as general guides to appropriate 
aesthetic appreciation of nature.47 
 
Perhaps he is correct when discussing aesthetic awareness in industrialized 
countries, where the scientific interpretation of the world is dominant. Nevertheless, with 
regard to the notion of a pluralistic model, I have a different focus from Carlson. What I 
emphasize in this model is the possibility of an unscientific approach to nature aesthetics. 
                                                           





While a pluralistic model is not the denial of the scientific approach, I suggest that 
unscientific views are also important for examining our appreciation of nature. 
 
An Alternative Approach to Nature Aesthetics 
I discussed the traditional Western aesthetic consciousness at the beginning of this 
chapter,  presenting such characteristics as regularity, uniformity, and symmetry as 
paradigms of beauty in Western culture. This discussion showed the difficulty in 
developing nature aesthetics in light of the Western aesthetic consciousness because these 
characteristics are seldom found in natural objects. On the other hand, it is often claimed 
that the Japanese traditional aesthetics contains notions appropriate for developing 
ecological attitudes. In fact, differing from the Western art, Japanese traditional art is 
closely associated with one’s interaction with the natural world. Thus, I focus on 
Japanese aesthetic consciousness as an alternative approach to nature aesthetics. 
Although it is not possible to discuss all aspects of Japanese aesthetics in this section, as a 
starting point, it is helpful to examine one of the fundamental elements of aesthetics, 
aesthetic quality, in order to understand the distinctive concepts of beauty in the Japanese 
tradition. 
Donald Keene introduces Japanese aesthetic consciousness in his essay “Japanese 
Aesthetics” in terms of Tsurezuregusa (“Essays in Idleness”), written by a fourteenth-
century Buddhist monk, Kenkō.48 Tsurezuregusa is an essay based on daily life; however, 
it is full of expressions of the Japanese consciousness of beauty. This fact indicates that 
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the Japanese way of life is closely associated with aesthetics. Keene says that it is 
difficult to explain all aspects of Japanese aesthetics in his short essay. Nevertheless, he 
identifies four aesthetics qualities peculiar to Japanese culture in light of examining the 
essay by Kenkō. These qualities are “suggestion,” “irregularity,” “simplicity,” and 
“perishability.” When you compare these qualities with traditional Western aesthetic 
qualities, it is clear that Japanese aesthetics is based on quite different aesthetic 
paradigms. Because they are so different, one may have difficulties understanding why 
these four characteristics have been positively appreciated in Japanese aesthetics. Let us 
consider each characteristic and examine how it can be aesthetically appreciated. 
Keene uses the term suggestion to describe the potential to expand one’s 
imagination beyond the literal facts. Things at their climax stage, for example, the full 
moon and cherry blossoms in full bloom, are undoubtedly beautiful; however, they do not 
let us imagine the process of becoming or fading. Keene explains, “The full moon or the 
cherry blossoms at their peak do not suggest the crescent or the buds (or the waning 
moon and the strewn flowers), but the crescent or the buds do suggest full flowering.”49 
Of course, things at their full stage are also a part of the dynamic process of nature. They 
cannot be separated from their beginning or fading stages. Nevertheless, since Japanese 
people positively appreciate their feelings of expectation or sorrow toward objects as 
aesthetic emotions, things at their off peak are considered to be more aesthetically 
appreciable in terms of their nature which raises various sorts of feelings in the 
appreciator.  
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The aesthetic quality of suggestion is not a characteristic which exists externally 
in an object. Rather, it is a characteristic which appears through the interaction between 
the subject and the object. Just what sort of objective characteristics does suggestion 
depend upon? I believe that this characteristic involves the incompleteness of objects. 
Incompleteness indicates that there is room for one’s imagination. It stimulates our 
imagination and produces various sorts of deep aesthetic emotions. Keene introduces 
incompleteness as the second category of Japanese aesthetic qualities. However, 
suggestion and incompleteness are not independent aesthetic qualities. The fondness for 
“suggestion” implies that incompleteness of nature has been positively appreciated in 
Japanese culture. 
The second quality irregularity involves two characteristics, incompleteness and 
asymmetry. Keene explains the fondness for incompleteness in terms of Kenkō’s oponion 
in Tsurezuregusa: “Leaving something incomplete makes it interesting, and gives one the 
feeling that there is room for growth.”50 Incompleteness should not be interpreted 
literally. If things are in their complete form, there is no potential for further development 
or change. In this sort of state, the force of becoming of nature is not fully expressed. 
Therefore, incompleteness is a manifestation of the dynamic life force in objects. 
Interestingly, this characteristic is not only appreciated in animate things but also in 
inanimate things. For example, Kenkō agrees that collecting complete sets of books is 
considered to be unintelligent. Imperfect sets are more attractive.51 
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The other characteristic asymmetry is expressed in various art styles. Architecture, 
poetry, calligraphy, ceramics, flower arrangement, and many other Japanese traditional 
arts manifest themselves as a fondness for asymmetrical forms.52 Because of the 
influence of Zen Buddhism, many Japanese traditional arts are based on achieving 
oneness with nature. Symmetrical forms are seldom found in the natural world. 
Therefore, when someone wants to produce artworks in accord with nature, he or she 
tends to prefer asymmetrical forms. 
Simplicity is the abandonment of extravagance. Possessing unnecessary things or 
showing off luxurious things is not appreciated in the Japanese aesthetics; rather, these 
sorts of conspicuous luxury are regarded as shameful. For instance, Kenkō suggests that a 
man with simple tastes and no possessions is excellent.53 Nevertheless, simplicity is not a 
manifestation of poverty. It is a beauty transcending material insufficiency. This 
implication of simplicity becomes clear after examining the beauty of wabi. 
Wabi is an aesthetic expression distinctive to Japanese culture. This notion is fully 
expressed in the tea ceremony; yet, the development of wabi is complex, reflecting 
various aesthetic notions in different art forms. Haga Kōshirō explains that the aesthetic 
expression of wabi is not a single concept but reflects several aspects of beauty.54 Among 
these aspects, simplicity is the most important element in wabi since its original verb 
wabiru connotes “being disappointed by failing in some enterprise or living miserable 
and poverty-stricken life.”55 From the original meaning, one may misunderstand that 
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wabi is an expression of poverty. However, the author of the Zen-cha Roku clearly 
distinguishes wabi from poverty: 
Always bear in mind that wabi involves not regarding incapacities as 
incapacitating, not feeling that lacking something is deprivation, not thinking that 
what is not provided is deficiency. To regard incapacity as incapacitating, to feel 
that lack is deprivation, or to believe that not being provided for is poverty is not 
wabi but rather the spirit of a pauper.56 
  
The essential meaning of wabi, according to Haga, is “transcending material 
insufficiency so that one discovers in it a world of spiritual freedom unbounded by 
material things.”57 Wabi is not a superficial expression of beauty. It is an implication of 
inner richness achieved in light of transcending materialistic desire. 
Despite this focus on wabi, luxurious architectures and ornaments are also 
appreciated in Japanese culture. One can observe a distinctive contrast between 
conspicuous luxury and simplicity when comparing the gold pavilion in Rokuon-ji and 
the silver pavilion in Jishou-ji in Kyoto. Both pavilions are Zen Buddhist temples, and 
modeled after the Ruri-den in Saihō-ji; therefore, the structure of these pavilions are quite 
similar. Nevertheless, their appearances are significantly different. The gold pavilion is 
covered by pure gold leaves. Its shiny, gorgeous appearance gives us a strong impression 
of luxurious beauty. On the other hand, the silver pavilion shows moderate beauty in 
natural tastes. This architecture is graceful, but quite simple. Perhaps, it is easier to 
admire the beauty of the gold pavilion rather than the silver pavilion for those who have 
never learned the traditional Japanese aesthetics. However, the silver pavilion manifests 
Japanese beauty more significantly. The person who planned the construction of the 
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silver pavilion, Ashikaga Yoshimasa, participated in various kinds of the Japanese 
traditional art, geido. His contribution to the development of geido has been significant. 
Therefore, we can suppose that Yoshimasa was more sensitive to Japanese beauty. It is 
quite reasonable that we find more Japanese aesthetic taste in the silver pavilion.  
The fourth Japanese aesthetic quality is perishability. According to Keene, this 
quality is the most unusual for the Westerners, since in the West, permanence rather than 
perishability has been highly appreciated.58 The fondness for permanence in Western 
culture goes back to ancient Greece. Because of the difficulty in understanding change, 
most Greek philosophers regarded material objects as illusory and nonexistent. This 
negative view of the material world has resulted in the development of the conception of 
matter as permanent. As a result, the natural world was considered not to be significant 
for philosophical discussions because of its lack of permanency.59 On the contrary, 
impermanency has been highly appreciated in Japanese culture. This tendency may partly 
be a result of the influence of Buddhist teachings. 
In the Buddhist tradition, impermanence is believed to be reality per se. This 
fundamental principle has made people think that seeking permanence results in 
misunderstanding of the world. The notion of impermanence may sound nihilistic. 
Nevertheless, it is not the denial of the world. The term impermanence should not be 
translated negatively. If everything is in flux, then, it has a potential to produce 
something unforeseen. Therefore, impermanence is a manifestation of the unpredictable 
potentiality and the dynamism of the world. 
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One example of the appreciation of perishability is the affection for fading cherry 
blossoms. People have deep aesthetic emotions when seeing the ephemeral life of a 
flower. Generally, flowers are aesthetically appreciable in other cultures as well; yet, 
what people recognize as an aesthetic quality may be different. Therefore, one may not 
find it difficult to understand the Japanese affection for cherry blossoms. However, one 
may be surprised to hear that the transiency of human existence has also been recognized 
as a necessary condition of beauty in Japan.60 
The examination of aesthetic qualities shows that the Japanese aesthetic 
consciousness provides an appropriate ground for developing nature aesthetics. First, the 
fondness for asymmetrical forms accords with nature aesthetics. In Western culture, 
people failed to see beauty in nature partly because of their preference for symmetrical 
forms, which cannot be found in the natural world. Symmetry has been appreciated 
mainly with the aesthetic standards of picturesque beauty; nonetheless, asymmetry was 
negatively valued until the development of the aesthetic notion of sublimity in light of 
scientific discoveries in the seventeenth century. To the contrary, Japanese people 
achieved their appreciation of nature as it is in part because of their affection for 
asymmetrical forms. This aesthetic preference suggests that the sublime has been 
aesthetically appreciable even before the development of natural sciences. 
Such aesthetic qualities as incompleteness and perishability manifest positive 
appreciation of the spontaneity and dynamism of nature. Because the perfection and 
stability of objects were not people’s aesthetic concern, nature’s unframed beauty was 
appropriately appreciated. The fondness for incompleteness and perishability made 
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people focus on the process of aesthetic objects; therefore, it is possible to say that order-
oriented appreciation has been traditionally developed in Japanese culture without 
scientific understanding.  
Unfortunately, in spite of its appropriate ground for nature aesthetics, the 
influence of Japanese traditional aesthetics on current Japanese society is very significant. 
It may be partly because Japan has been Westernized significantly in terms of 
industrialization. However, the traditional aesthetic consciousness has not yet died out. It 
may be possible to enhance ecological attitudes by reintroducing this sort of aesthetics 




ONTOLOGICAL DISCUSSIONS OF NATURAL BEAUTY 
The Subjective Perception of the Beauty 
In accordance with a schema developed by Galileo and Descartes, characteristics 
of things are divided into two categories: primary properties and secondary properties. 
Quantifiable features such as length, width, and depth are regarded as primary properties. 
There are no subjective differences in the process of measuring the quantifiable features. 
On the other hand, secondary properties depend upon the perception of individuals. 
Tastes, color smells, textures, sounds, and other unquantifiable features were originally 
included in this category. Because of the development in science, some secondary 
properties can now be considered primary. For example, it is possible to define color in 
terms of the numerical values of wavelengths. However, G. E. Moore states that the value 
of the wavelength is not sufficient to describe yellow: 
We may try to define [yellow], by describing its physical equivalent; we may state 
what kind of light-vibrations must stimulate the normal eye, in order that we may 
perceive it. But a moment’s reflection is sufficient to shew that those light-
vibrations are not themselves what we mean by yellow. They are not what we 
perceive. Indeed we should never have been able to discover their existence, 
unless we had first been struck by the patent difference of quality between the 
different colours. The most we can be entitled to say of those vibrations is that 
they are what corresponds in space to the yellow which we actually perceive.61 
 
Color reflects personal perceptions more than other physical properties do. Therefore, it 
is still possible to be included in secondary properties. In general, aesthetic features are 
                                                           





regarded as secondary properties. Judging aesthetic values such as beauty and sublimity 
significantly depends on personal perceptions and preferences; therefore, aesthetic 
qualities usually can be conceived in terms of the judgments of subjective beings. Then, 
has nature aesthetics also inherited this attribute? 
It is often claimed that beauty is in the eye of the beholder. This concept has been 
agreed upon by value subjectivists, who regard aesthetic qualities as secondary 
properties. According to this view, the existence of subjective beings is crucial for 
aesthetic values. For example, J. Baird Callicott takes this position:  
Value is, as it were, projected onto natural objects or events by the subjective 
feelings of observers. If all consciousness were annihilated at a stroke, there 
would be no good and evil, no beauty and ugliness, no right or wrong; only 
impassive phenomena would remain…. Mass and motion, color and flavor, good 
and evil, beauty and ugliness, all alike, are equally potentialities which are 
actualized in relationship to us or to other similarly constituted organisms.62  
 
According to his view, no beauty exists in nature without a subject being present. Only 
the potentiality of beauty exists in the external world. From the value subjectivists’ 
viewpoint, there was no beauty before the appearance of higher forms of life with a 
capacity for aesthetic valuing; therefore, natural beauty has appeared as a result of the 
evolutionary process. Callicott also mentions that although values are anthropogenic 
(created in human consciousness), they need not be anthropocentric (focused on valuing 
humans and their experiences). He says, “Value may be subjective and affective, but it is 
intentional, not self-referential.”63 Natural beauty exists only after the existence of a 
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valuer, but this beauty may be intrinsically valued for itself, not just for the aesthetic 
satisfaction of an observer.  
 The appreciation of nature has evolved with changes in our perceptions of nature. 
As stated in the previous chapter, the shift of natural value is apparent in Western culture. 
Natural entities such as mountains were negatively judged based on the Christian 
aesthetic standard of the Middle Ages which highly appreciated symmetry and 
geometrical features. However, people began to perceive beauty in nature as a result of 
the reinterpretation of the biblical text and developments in science. Mountains, which 
were considered ugly before, have become sublime and eventually beautiful.64 The 
subjectivist position shows that the aesthetic value of mountains has been changing over 
time, while their external qualities have not. What has been changing is people’s minds or 
their “eye” when seeing mountains. According to this view, value can change 
significantly due to a shift of subjective perception. Because it can change, aesthetic 
value may be criticized as being too weak and shaky as a ground for environmental 
ethics. However, natural beauty is beyond personal preferences. It is possible to develop 
objective accounts of nature aesthetics. 
 
The Objective Existence of Beauty 
“Nature is beautiful.” If we consider this sentence from the subjectivist viewpoint, 
beauty is just a perception in our mind. However, when we say something is beautiful, we 
refer to objective qualities in things. What then is the source of perceptions in nature 
aesthetics? Holmes Rolston, III points out that there are two sorts of aesthetic qualities: 
                                                           
64 See Nicolson, Mountain Gloom and Mountain Glory. 
 
 37
“aesthetic capacities” and “aesthetic properties.”65 The former are the subjective 
capacities needed to experience beauty. The latter lies objectively in natural things. 
Aesthetic properties exist whether or not they are experienced by subjective beings. 
When we value nature, we are not merely projecting our values onto nature but 
discovering aesthetic properties in nature. Our sense of beauty may be in the mind, but 
nature, which generates the experience of beauty, is not.66 Rolston recognizes objective 
qualities which produce aesthetic appreciation, although he says that aesthetics is a 
human construct. Aesthetic properties are necessary but not sufficient for natural beauty. 
If we do not discover aesthetic properties, then, beauty cannot exist. 
Natural beauty still seems fragile even if objective aesthetic properties are 
recognized. The existence of beauty depends on whether or not it is perceived. Moreover, 
it may be valued negatively through the subjective valuing process. However, nature 
aesthetics can move further toward firmer ground in terms of the inherent value of nature. 
The concept of positive aesthetics helps us recognize the objective beauty in nature. 
Carlson has written extensively about positive aesthetics. According to this view, 
everything in nature is beautiful. This view can be represented by John Constable’s 
comment, “There is nothing ugly; I never saw an ugly thing in my life.”67 How can we 
say that all natural things are beautiful? Carlson points out that the advancement in 
natural science is connected with the development of positive aesthetics.68 As mentioned 
in the previous chapter, nature aesthetics is not just picturesque beauty but also a deeper 
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concept of beauty which includes the appreciation of nature’s features such as natural 
history, biological complexity, and dynamic functions. Science contributes to providing 
knowledge about these properties of nature. It makes us understand interrelations and 
functions of the natural world and broadens people’s aesthetic sense. Indeed, many places 
which are not beautiful can be considered interesting in terms of proper information. 
According to Carlson, scientific information can help us see beauty where we could not 
see it before. In light of the intimate relationship between the development of science 
(especially ecology) and positive aesthetics, and of the fact that ecology emphasizes on 
qualities such as unity, harmony and balance, it is justified to claim that people see 
patterns and harmony in nature instead of meaningless jumble.69 
Another point made by Carlson is that nature should be appreciated in a different 
way from art. He distinguishes appreciation of nature from that of art. As mentioned in 
the previous chapter, the former is “order appreciation,” while the latter is “design 
appreciation.” Therefore, the structure of nature in terms of geological and biological 
forces needs to be understood. Nature aesthetics can be achieved in terms of proper 
information and education concerning the natural forces and processes. All natural 
entities possess these kinds of natural order; therefore, order appreciation is an important 
factor in achieving impartial appreciation of all natural elements. According to Carlson, 
natural order “can be appreciated once our awareness and understanding of the forces 
which produce it and the story which illuminates it are adequately developed. In this 
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sense all nature is equally appreciable….”70 By appreciating natural order in light of 
science, nature aesthetics can become object-oriented, that is, objective. The beauty of 
nature can be beyond subjective evaluation. 
Hargrove also examines art and nature appreciation in his book Foundations of 
Environmental Ethics.71 He claims that our duty to preserve natural beauty is stronger 
than our duty to preserve artworks. Preserving something beautiful contributes to 
enhancing the general good in the world whether it is natural beauty or artistic beauty. 
However, Hargrove points out, “the works of art and works of nature depend on different 
kinds of creative activity and thus on somewhat different standards for aesthetic 
appreciation.”72 Nature is self-creation, while art is a creative activity by an artist. Since a 
natural object lacks a design or an intention, it is an entity whose existence precedes its 
essence; therefore, beauty emerges only when the natural object takes physical form. In 
Hargrove’s words, “Existence is an aesthetic property of natural objects.”73 Physical 
existence is a fundamental and necessary factor in nature aesthetics; however, mere 
existence alone cannot be the basis of aesthetic judgments about natural beauty. What 
else is needed for nature aesthetics? 
Carlson points out that appropriate aesthetic standards or categorizations are also 
necessary for nature aesthetics. The natural world must be valued positively when it is 
perceived through appropriate aesthetic categories. The establishment of proper aesthetic 
standards for nature appreciation becomes possible, according to Carlson, as a result of 
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the development of natural science and the complex relationship between correctness in 
science and aesthetic goodness: 
If our science did not discover, uncover, or create such qualities [as order, 
regularity harmony, balance, tension, conflict, resolution, and so forth] in the 
natural world and explain that world in terms of them, it would not accomplish its 
task of making it seem more intelligible to us; rather, it would leave the world 
incomprehensible, as any of the various world views which we regard as 
superstition seem to us to leave it.74 
 
If we apply the aesthetic standards of art, the beauty of nature may not be recognizable. 
Therefore, according to Carlson, we need standards for nature aesthetics, which are 
developed out of natural science. 
 
Negative Aspects of Carlson’s Position 
Carlson is correct when he says that proper aesthetic standards are necessary for 
achieving nature aesthetics. For example, art will be valued wrongly when it is judged by 
improper aesthetic standards. Works of art need to be properly categorized when being 
viewed aesthetically. Likewise, mere physical existence is not sufficient in order to 
appreciate nature properly. It has to be judged with appropriate aesthetic standards. 
According to Carlson’s account, science plays a major role in the aesthetic categorization 
of nature. However, there are some problems with Carlson’s comment on the contribution 
of science to establishing aesthetic standards.  
First, it is correct that science can contribute to enhancing our understanding of 
natural aesthetic qualities; however, it is not always true that science discovers natural 
qualities such as order and harmony. The notion of balance or harmony in nature, for 
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example, has been replaced in ecology by dynamic disequilibrium. Such shifts in the 
focus of ecology have been common.  
In the beginning of the twentieth century, Frederic E. Clements proposed the 
concept of a “superorganism” to describe the holistic characteristic of the biotic 
community.75 According to his account, the community goes through a cycle of organic 
development, which is similar to the developmental stages of individual organisms. This 
cycle begins with invasions, which are followed by succession and the climax state. 
Clements focused on the interaction of habitat, life forms and species, and tried to extract 
the essential process of biologic progress out of complex and chaotic characteristics of 
nature. However, twenty years later, Clements’ holistic view was challenged by the 
individualistic account of nature by Henry A. Gleason.76 This position is focused on 
continuous spatial and temporal changes. Gleason explains: 
… each separate community is merely one minute part of a vast and ever-
changing kaleidoscope of vegetation, a part which is restricted  in its size, limited 
in its duration, never duplicated except in its present immediate vicinity, and there 
only as a coincidence, and rarely if ever repeated.77 
 
According to Gleason, the plant community can be understood as an individual 
phenomenon. He rejected the holistic harmonious account of nature as a theory without 
foundation and replaced it by a chaotic view of nature. Contrary to Carlson’s account, 
Gleason discovered unharmonious characteristics of natural vegetation in light of science. 
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I am not entirely opposed to Carlson’s view; nevertheless, science does not 
necessarily contribute to the positive evaluation of nature as described above. It is 
possible to achieve aesthetic standards as a result of scientific research. However, there is 
one thing we need to recognize in determining the contribution of science in establishing 
aesthetic standards. Our focus when conducting scientific research is crucial to the 
achievement of proper aesthetic standards for nature. Science does not necessarily 
describe the external world objectively. It often reflects personal perceptions and grasps 
reality differently depending on our focus when viewing nature. For example, both 
scientists, Clements and Gleason, looked at natural vegetation and ended up with two 
extremely different accounts of nature. Differences in the understanding of vegetation 
result in different environmental attitudes and values. Clements’ holism views natural 
disturbances as exceptional, rare events. Natural environments are considered closed 
systems. His deterministic view assumes an a priori fixed state of nature to which nature 
is progressing. Once nature gets to the equilibrium point, it maintains this balanced state. 
This holistic account suggests the idea that every unit of nature is conservable. It may be 
easy to develop a preservationist attitude in terms of Clements’ holism; however, this 
theory ignores the dynamic forces of nature, which can also be appreciated positively. 
Gleason’s individualistic view, on the other hand, made the chaotic characteristics of 
nature prominent. Although Gleason emphasizes dynamic natural processes and the flux 
of nature, it is difficult to establish nature aesthetics from his position. Gleason’s theory 
can be used as a justification for the wanton exploitation of nature by humans. One may 
think that if everything is changing  without ideal states, it is not possible to develop 
environmental attitudes. Nothing can be protected if all things are in flux. What I want to 
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discuss by comparing these two different accounts of nature is not which theory grasps 
reality better. Rather my intent is to show that different characteristics of nature become 
prominent depending on our focus when looking at nature. If we scale down to individual 
populations, we may see stochastic features of nature. If we scale up and grasp the 
interaction between organisms and habitat, we may see the holistic function of nature. 
Therefore, we need to adjust our focus in order to establish proper aesthetic standards for 
nature. 
The holistic view of nature continues to be important in the field of ecology. For 
example, Leopold, emphasizes the integrity of the biotic community in his essay “The 
Land Ethic.”  However, the current holistic understanding of the world is different from 
Clements’ holism. It follows the path between classical holism and Gleason’s 
individualism. Current holism emphasizes the interrelationship among natural entities as 
Clements suggests. However, there is no fixed ideal state of nature unlike Clements’ 
account of the climax stage in nature. Natural environments are regarded as open 
systems; therefore, both natural and anthropogenic disturbances are natural events. The 
new holistic view supports the idea that everything is in flux, as does Gleason’s view. 
However, it does not necessary mean that nature is characterized by chaotic or 
unharmonious features. Unpredictable natural events are valued positively as interesting 
factors in nature. The current view of nature in ecology provides some clues to the 
establishment of proper aesthetic standards in terms of recognizing positive values in 
natural forces, organisms, and the interrelationship among them.  
Second, I object to Carlson’s justification for the idea that nature remains 
unintelligible and incomprehensible without scientific achievements as a basis for 
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uncovering aesthetic qualities in nature. In his essay, Carlson admits that natural science 
is a story to describe the world.78 Nevertheless, he excessively emphasizes science as a 
means of disclosing aesthetic properties in nature in his theory of positive aesthetics. He 
seems to depend on science too much in spite of his recognition of the narrative aspect of 
science. Even if Carlson’s emphasis on science accords with his intention, and is correct 
at least in the development of nature appreciation in Western culture, he weakens his 
account by presenting science as a story, opening the possibility that unscientific 
narratives may also contribute appropriately to nature aesthetics.  
As repeatedly mentioned in this essay, the contribution of science to nature 
aesthetics cannot be denied; however, it is still possible to appreciate nature positively 
without scientific discoveries. For example, Japanese traditional culture is well known for 
its distinctive sensitivity to natural beauty. People recognized beauty in nature’s 
dynamism long before the development of science, and appreciated it positively in 
various forms. One distinctive form of nature appreciation in Japanese culture is 
religious. In Shinto, various kinds of natural forces or organisms have been worshipped 
as kami. The eighteenth-century Shinto scholar, Motoori Norinaga explains what kami 
refers to: 
Generally speaking, (the word) “kami” denotes, in the first place, the deities of 
heaven and earth that appear in the ancient texts and also the spirits enshrined in 
the shrines; furthermore, among all kinds of beings – including not only human 
beings but also such objects as birds, beasts, trees, grass, seas, mountains, and so 
forth – any being whatsoever which possesses some eminent quality our of the 
ordinary, and is awe-inspiring, is called kami. 
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One may object that the worship of nature is merely nature romanticism. However, this 
kind of nature appreciation has resulted from keen observation of nature through daily 
activities. People have developed appreciation of nature by living close to the nonhuman 
world. Kami is different from a personified icon such as God in the Judeo-Christian 
tradition. The nature worship in the Shinto tradition is the appreciation of dynamic 
natural forces. In this sense, even though this sort of appreciation of nature is not 
scientific, nature could be appreciated properly. Japanese nature worship shows us that it 
is possible to appreciate nature without a scientific framework. The Shinto tradition is 
merely one of the Japanese relationships with nature. Nature has been positively valued 
in various ways. I discuss this topic in the next section and the following chapter. 
Another problem with Carlson’s position is discussed by Hargrove. Hargrove 
points out Carlson’s neglect of creativity in nature when discussing characteristics of 
aesthetic judgment of art and of nature. Carlson explains that the aesthetic judgment of 
art is performed based on the correct categorization of artworks. For example, 
impressionistic pictures should be judged according to the aesthetic standard of 
impressionism. If these pictures are judged under incorrect categories and with different 
aesthetic standards, the aesthetic judgments are not correct. Moreover, because of the 
prior-existence of aesthetic standards, artworks, when categorized correctly, may be 
judged negatively. On the other hand, nature does not have prior design or (a human) 
designer; therefore, it does not have a prior-existing aesthetic standard and cannot be 
judged in the same way as art. Carlson writes:  
Unlike works of art, natural objects and landscapes are not created or produced by 
humans, but rather “discovered” by them… Art is created, while nature is 
discovered. The determination of categories of art and of their correctness are in 
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general prior to and independent of aesthetic considerations, while the 
determinations of categories of nature and of their correctness are in an important 
sense dependent upon aesthetic considerations. These two differences are closely 
related. Since nature is discovered, rather than created, in science, unlike in art, 
creativity plays its major role in the determinations of categories and of their 
correctness; and considerations of aesthetic goodness come into play at this 
creative level. Thus, our science creates categories of nature in part in light of 
aesthetic goodness and in so doing makes the natural world appear aesthetically 
good to us.79  
   
According to Carlson, Hargrove notes, “the creativity is not in the creation of the objects 
but in the creation of the appropriate aesthetic standards.”80 If we accept Carlson’s 
position, the natural order is regarded as not being creative. Carlson is correct to some 
degree. First, his position explains our appropriate position in nature appreciation. 
Natural beauty is not an anthropogenic creation. Thus, inappropriate human modification 
of nature, for example, based on the aesthetic standard of picturesque beauty (we can see 
such modification in gardening), is not appreciated in nature aesthetics. Second, we do 
discover aesthetic qualities of nature through scientific studies, and develop appropriate 
aesthetic standards for nature appreciation. The aesthetic standard for nature does not 
exist in advance. We need to categorize nature and understand its beauty by developing 
the proper standard of nature aesthetics. Science has been playing an important role in the 
process of discovering natural beauty and developing appropriate aesthetic standards. 
Third, there is creativity in the task of establishing the aesthetic standard of nature. After 
accepting these positive points in Carlson’s position, however, Hargrove points out 
Carlson’s neglect of the creativity in the creation of nature: 
…Carlson is in error in concluding that nature is not itself creative, for it is 
possible to construct a position that attributes creativity to nature, is at the same 
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time compatible with both theistic and scientific perspectives, and is firmly 
grounded in traditional philosophy.81 
 
What Hargrove wants to argue is that intentional planning or designing is not necessary 
for creativity. He discusses the theistic account of the creation of nature and concludes 
that whether or not we accept the theory of the divine creation of the world, the existence 
of nature precedes its essence. This view provides a way to attribute creativity to nature: 
If nature’s existence precedes its essence, the natural product of nature’s 
indifferent creativity, whether through God or through itself, is and has to be good 
and beautiful, because whatever is so created always brings with it compatible 
standards of goodness and beauty. Put another way, nature is itself its own 
standard of goodness and beauty, making ugliness impossible as a product of 
nature’s own creative activity.82 
 
Differing from Carlson, who recognizes creativity merely in establishing proper 
aesthetics standards for nature appreciation by science, Hargrove finds creativity in the 
self-creation of nature. Moreover, Hargrove’s position supports the idea that aesthetic 
standards are produced through natural creative activities. His account overcomes the 
excessive dependence of positive aesthetics on science. It provides a basis for nature 
aesthetics without scientific discoveries and enhances our understanding of objective 
aesthetic value. Here, the existence of natural objects and a self-created aesthetic standard 
allows nature to have objective beauty independent of human perception.  
 
A Difficulty with the Positioning of Human Beings 
It is often claimed that human manipulation of nature is a negative factor in the 
appreciation of natural beauty because the beauty of nature is a result of self-creative 
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activity. This view depends on the concept that humans are outside of nature. According 
to this view, anthropogenic manipulation of environments is not natural; therefore, 
human interference should be avoided so as to preserve the objective beauty of nature. 
For example, Robert Elliot and Hargrove support this position. 
Elliot shows the negativity of human interruptions in terms of “the anti-
replacement thesis.”83 According to this thesis, aesthetic value in nature will be lost or 
reduced due to human interference even when we try to restore environments because 
human interference disrupts natural history and natural processes, and alters natural 
things, turning them into non-natural human artifacts. Elliot recognizes a broader concept 
of aesthetic value in nature, and argues that nature’s aesthetic value is a basis for nature’s 
intrinsic value. Therefore, human interference results not only in a decrease in the 
aesthetic value of nature but also in the intrinsic value of nature. Although Elliot admits 
that we should intervene when it is necessary, he claims that restored environments have 
less natural value than the original ones.  
Hargrove also notes the negative influence of human interferences on the value of 
nature:  
When we make plans to help or improve nature, the plans are not nature’s but our 
own, and the result is the stifling of natural creativity and the transformation of 
the natural objects influenced into human artifacts.84 
 
The value of art objects decreases when they are not original. Likewise, nature has more 
value when it is formed by natural processes without anthropogenic interference. 
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Furthermore, he explains, not interfering with nature is also a human decision. When the 
preservationist is doing nothing, he or she is still doing something.  
If it is correct that any human decision is considered to be anthropogenic 
interference, and eventually results in decreasing the aesthetic value of nature, it is 
difficult to develop the coexistence of humans and natural beauty. According to this 
account, the beauty of nature always exists separately from human societies. This view 
can be used as a basis for justifying the rejection of wanton human interference with 
nature. However, the separation of humans from the aesthetic value of nature does not 
satisfy the fundamental aim of nature aesthetics, which I explained in the introduction of 
this essay. Nature aesthetics should work as a means of realizing our ethical 
consciousness toward nature. In order to achieve this primary goal, we need to develop 
nature aesthetics which does not deny human interaction with nature. As a solution to the 
separation of humans and natural beauty, I explore Eastern philosophy based on a non-
dualistic world view and examine its distinctive approach to nature aesthetics. 
 
Natural Beauty in Eastern Philosophy 
As a starting point of examining Eastern culture, let me consider one fundamental 
question about beauty: what is the quality of beauty per se?  According to value 
subjectivists, the existence of beauty depends on subjective experiences. Thus, beauty is a 
human perception. On the other hand, if natural beauty exists objectively in the external 
world as value objectivists claim, there are aesthetic properties in the world. The 
interpretation of beauty can vary depending on how we characterize it ontologically. 
Nevertheless, in both cases, provided that we think of beauty in terms of traditional 
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Western metaphysics, beauty is a fixed concept or quality similar to Platonic universal 
concepts. If this Western understanding of beauty is correct, then beauty cannot exist in 
the Buddhist tradition because no thing exists in the world according to their 
understanding of reality as emptiness. The Eastern concept of emptiness provides a 
different approach to understanding beauty. 
One famous school of emptiness-teaching (sunyata-vada) is the Madhyamika 
school in Mahayana Buddhism. Nāgārjuna, the founder of this school, reemphasized the 
Buddha’s rejection of all speculative views. According to Nāgārjuna’s teaching, 
everything that arises depends on other conditions (on relationships to other phenomena); 
therefore, nothing can have an original inherent nature. That is, there is nothing with its 
own nature, no true substance which exists by itself. Therefore, reality is recognized as a 
passing phenomenon, which is in between absolute “non-existence” and “substantial 
existence.”85 In other words, this interpretation of reality neither denies the external 
existence of entities in reality nor supports their universal substantial natures. 
Nevertheless, the teaching of emptiness is not nihilistic; rather, its focus is on the 
interrelatedness of the world. According to this teaching, nothing can exist eternally or 
without depending on other conditions.  
The emptiness of the world is not a denial of beauty in nature. The Buddha’s 
sermon on the flower provides a clue to understanding beauty in the Buddhist tradition. 
In the story, one of Buddha’s disciples grasped a message by direct mind-to-mind 
transmission from the Buddha who was holding a flower in his hand without saying 
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anything. This message was an esoteric teaching by the Buddha. It was not transmitted in 
words. One possible interpretation is that if nothing exists in the world, that even the 
flower does not exist; however, there is an impression which we can perceive from the 
non-substantial flower. Beauty is neither a fixed concept nor a quality which can exist 
eternally. There is no such thing as beautifulness in the world. However, within the flux 
of the world, it is possible to perceive aesthetic impressions. 
Consider the discussion of impressions developed by David Hume86 in which 
beauty is understood as an impression. In his discussion, Hume distinguishes two 
different classes of perceptions based on their degrees of vivacity: the less lively 
perceptions are called “thoughts or ideas,” and the lively ones called “impressions.” 
There is a difference between senses when one is hungry and when one just thinks about 
being hungry. Thus, it is reasonable to distinguish two levels of perceptions. According to 
Hume, impressions are the basis for developing one’s concepts. If someone has never 
perceived an impression of beauty, he or she cannot know what beauty is. More complex 
concepts can be resolved into simple ideas, and eventually their corresponding 
impressions.  
Hume’s understanding of concepts based on impressions seems similar to the 
Buddhist tradition. This similarity is true at least in the sense that both Hume and 
Buddhism reject or do not support the theory of universal concepts of things, which you 
can see in the Platonic world view. However, I suppose that there is still a difference 
which should not be neglected between the philosophy of Hume and that of Buddhism. 
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Hume suggests that impressions are the origins of concepts. According to his philosophy, 
these concepts are different from Platonic universal concepts; nevertheless, they are 
personal concepts, which consist of individual speculative views. Buddhist philosophy, 
on the contrary, does not support the personal view either. In Buddhism, “views” are 
believed to be the origin of suffering. Speculative viewpoints, theories, or opinions are 
seen as causes of attachments to the narrow-self (biased world views), and thus lead to 
suffering.87 Therefore, impressions should not be regarded as the origin of thoughts but 
should be perceived as they are in the Buddhist tradition. 
If natural beauty in the Buddhist tradition is an impression which can be 
perceived by humans, one may think that the Buddhist view is similar to the value 
subjectivists’ recognition of beauty as a human perception. However, Buddhist beauty is 
not necessarily a subjective experience. Because of the emptiness of the world, there is no 
distinction between humans and nature or self and others. There is neither subject nor 
object. Therefore, beauty should be understood in light of a transcending of the dualistic 
world view. When we see a flower and perceive an aesthetic impression, a flower is not 
only outside of us but also within us. Moreover, there is neither “me” nor “us,” only 
causally dependent dharmas (phenomena) can be observed. At the level of the ultimate 
truth, the reality is inconceivable and inexpressible. Therefore, there is no way through 
which we can describe the world, for example, with language. However, at the level of 
conventional truth, which can be expressed by using terms such as person and thing, 
beauty is a phenomenon which a person’s condition depends on.88 We can understand 
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Eastern natural beauty only after overcoming the dichotomy of subject and object. Beauty 
can be perceived as a part of phenomena in the interrelated, ever-changing world in the 
Buddhist tradition. 
 
Nature Aesthetics Based on Transcendentalism 
The transcendental relationship between subject and object is fundamental in the 
Buddhist tradition. Nevertheless, Buddhist schools show different ways to achieve this 
relationship. As previously stated, the Madhyamika school focuses on the interrelatedness 
of the world and overcomes the dichotomy between self and the world. This 
interpretation is used as a basis for achieving a selfless world view. On the other hand, 
the Yogācāra school has achieved the transcendental view in terms of the idealistic 
account of reality. Similar to Western transcendental idealism,89 the Yogācāra school 
understands the world as a construction in the mind: 
Visible entities are not found, the external world is merely thought (citta) seen as 
a multiplicity (of objects); body, property and environment – these I call thought-
only (citta-mātra).90 
 
There is a limitation to what we can experience in the world. Thus, if we identify what is 
in mind with reality, the physical world cannot be fully explained. However, the 
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Yogācāra School rejects the discussion about extra-mental reality based on the claim that 
it is meaningless to argue about what one cannot know or experience. This school 
transcends the subject/object duality by knowing the world as “representation only.” 
Either transcendental view denies the separation of humans from the natural 
world. There is no distinction between humans and nature. Therefore, this sort of view 
provides a solution to the problem highlighted as a resulted of the objective argument of 
natural beauty, which is the denial of the human participation into the creation of natural 
beauty.  
Because of the significant influence of Buddhism, the transcendental world view 
has also prevailed in the Japanese tradition. Many Buddhist sects have developed in 
Japan. As a result, diverse transcendental views have developed in terms of different 
Buddhist philosophies. It is not appropriate to simplify these views; yet, it is still possible 
to point out distinctive characteristics common in most Japanese views. Perhaps one of 
the common notions among different Japanese transcendental views has developed as a 
result of the fusion of the Buddhist and the Shinto tradition. Shinto is the ancient 
Japanese tradition which existed before the arrival of Buddhism. As previously 
explained, various natural forces and organisms with some eminent quality have been 
worshipped as kami in this tradition. Thus, because of the influence of Shinto, nature 
tends to be appreciated positively as awe-inspiring, divine force. 
I propose three helpful implications of Japanese views for developing nature 
aesthetics. First, positive appreciation of nature can be justified in terms of nature 
worship in the Shinto tradition. Nature is highly valued as it is. Second, the non-dualistic 
view suggests that beauty is not simply a subjective perception. This notion rejects the 
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objection that nature aesthetics is too weak as a ground for environmental ethics. Third, 
the transcendental relationship denies the separation of humans from the natural world. 
The close relationship between humans and nature helps us enhance ethical 
consciousness toward nature. Based on these implications, it is possible to say that the 
Japanese transcendental view is promising as a basis for nature aesthetics. In the 
following chapter, I explore the Japanese value of nature further and examine distinctive 




ETYMOLOGICAL ANALYSIS OF THE VALUE OF NATURE   
The Value of Etymological Analysis 
Nature is perceived differently in different cultures. Human values, which are 
closely associated with religious and cultural values, have influenced how we see the 
world. The variety of our senses of value has resulted in diverse views of nature. As 
mentioned in chapter one, for example, nature was apprehended negatively in the 
Western tradition because nature’s “irrational” characteristics such as irregularity, 
complexity and asymmetry were not appreciable. On the other hand, it is often mentioned 
that the Japanese people have been sensitive to natural beauty and have traditionally 
developed a prominent nature aesthetics.  
Nature aesthetics in Japanese culture to a significant degree evolved out of 
religious values. However, it is a difficult task to clarify the religious influences on the 
Japanese value of nature because Japanese religion results from a fusion of various 
religious traditions such as Shinto, Buddhism, Taoism, Confucianism, and minor 
indigenous religions. A possible approach to understanding the Japanese valuation of 
nature is to analyze the word for nature in the Japanese language. Language reflects 
epistemological characteristics of objects; therefore, an etymological examination 
provides some clues to understand in the traditional world view in a particular religious, 
cultural, and historical background. In this chapter, I focus on the etymological 
characteristics of nature in the Japanese language as a means to comprehending the 
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Japanese way of valuing nature, and discuss religious and cultural valuation of nature 
based on those characteristics. I conclude with an examination of the value of nature in 
Japanese culture as an approach to practical nature aesthetics. 
 
Nature: The Force of Becoming 
The linguistic characteristics of the Japanese view of nature are discussed by 
Hubertus Tellenbach and Bin Kimura in their article “The Japanese Concept of Nature.”91 
The Japanese word for nature is shizen or Shi-zen (自然), which consists of two kanji 
characters. Before this word was introduced from China, there was no word which 
expressed the totality of all landscapes. Onozukara (自ずから) is an adverb word which 
was used in order to express the force of the becoming of nature before the arrival of the 
word shizen. This term corresponds to the Greek word phusis and is translated as 
“naturally or of itself” in English. As you can see, the term onozukara is written with the 
same character as shizen. This character (自) stands for two other meanings: mizukara 
(自ら, personally, self) and yori (of/from…). Onozukara (an objective expression) and 
mizukara (a subjective expression) are clearly separated in English; however, in Japanese 
both of the adverbial forms of nature (naturally) and self (personally) originate from the 
same common ground.92 
How can an objective term and a subjective one share the same root? The answer 
lies in the process-oriented understanding of the world reflected in these terms. 
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Tellenbach and Kimura point out that the third meaning attributed to the same character, 
yori, is stressed in both onozukara and mizukara. Furthermore, -kara in these words also 
signifies of/from. “The common root of onozukara and mizukara, which let the ancient 
Japanese to express both meanings by a single character, lies not in the origin of the 
action but rather in the process, of/from…. In expressing the common round of 
onozukara and mizukara, nature and self, the Japanese thus point to something like a 
spontaneous becoming, a force flowing forth from an original source.”93 The subjective 
force and the objective force can be expressed by the same character by emphasizing the 
force of becoming or changing in the subject and the object.  
What can be indicated in terms of the common origination of onozukara and 
mizukara is that the Japanese term for nature “shizen” stands for a different meaning 
from the English word nature. Tellenbach and Kimura point out three main meanings of 
nature: (1) something outside or opposite us, (2) certain constant traits of humans or 
animals, or different types of habitual disposition, and (3) modes of behavior designating 
membership in a species characterized by certain qualities.94 The second and the third 
meanings of nature manifest the idealistic view of the world distinctive to Western 
culture. In accordance with these meanings, nature designates fixed states of things or 
what a thing ought to be. The modern meaning of shizen corresponds to these meanings 
of nature. For example, when we say “shizen to shitashimu (communing with nature)”, 
shizen signifies the outside world. Obviously, subjective beings are outside of shizen in 
this expression. Moreover, in the phrase “shizen ni furumau (behave naturally),” this 
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shizen expresses an expected mode of behavior. We have certain models of behavior 
which we ought to follow. If we do not follow expected rules, it is fushizen (unnatural). 
However, these applications of the word shizen, which are common in the meanings of 
nature, are not manifestations of the essential meaning of shizen. According Tellenbach 
and Kimura, there are subtle though decisive differences between nature and shizen: 
Contrary to the object-oriented meaning of nature, Shi-zen/Ji-nen [jinen is a 
Buddhist word for shizen] has no such meaning. It never signifies the object as 
such, but presents only its respective manner of being and becoming. Even if Shi-
zen/Ji-nen is used as a substantive, one signifies by this less the objects of nature 
as such than their way of being ‘which exist without human action.’ Shi-zen in no 
way stands opposite the subject, rather it always indicates a certain state or mood 
in the subject.95 
 
What does it mean to say that shizen signifies a certain subjective state? If this remark is 
true, then is shizen only an expression about a subjective being? Of course, shizen is not a 
subjective statement. The point of their argument is that shizen is not based on a dualistic 
world view; rather, it implies not only spontaneous forces in the world but also a 
changing mood within a subjective being brought about by external spontaneity. 
Originally, there was no generic term expressing the totality of animate and 
inanimate components of the external world. Shizen, which designates their force of 
becoming, was applied to refer to nature as outside. The application of shizen as the word 
for nature “is correct etymologically inasmuch as an original meaning of Shi-zen names 
‘something like mountain, river, ocean, plant, animal, rain, wind, etc.’”96 However, the 
original meaning of shizen is not something outside of us. It implies the unity of subject 
and object through feelings which arise when we see something which possesses the 
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force of becoming. It does not mean that feelings per se are considered to be nature. But 
shizen is associated with the sense of an unforeseen event. Tellenbach and Kimura 
explain, “‘Were a case of shizen to arise’ means ‘were something unexpected to occur, a 
case of necessity, or should I meet with an accident.’”97 What is regarded as unnatural in 
a European sense can be regarded natural in Japanese traditional thought. The essential 
meaning of shizen can be understood by participating in the spontaneously changing 
world. The word shizen suggests that nature is not outside us but within us. The concept 
of the unity of the subject and the object based on spontaneity can be implied in terms of 
the etymological characteristic of shizen. 
 
The Concept of Unity in Religious Traditions 
The unique interpretation of nature shown by the etymological analysis of shizen 
implies the concept of the unity of self and the world. The notion of unity is not simply a 
linguistic implication. Overcoming the dichotomy between subject and object is 
supported by various religious traditions as well. For example, the unity realized in terms 
of spontaneous natural forces which exists within self and the world is the fundamental 
concept of the animism in Shinto. In traditional ceremonies such as Gyoshu (魚酒) and 
Denryō (田猟), people try to obtain supernatural power by eating plants and animals.98 It 
is believed that divine natural forces are immanent in beings living in mountains, fields, 
rivers, and oceans. Eating, which is a primary activity of living, is not only necessary for 
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taking nutrients from those natural products, but also important for obtaining these divine 
forces in nature. An important concept implied by these Shinto rituals is the continuity of 
humans and nature. It is believed that self and the world can become one through the 
divine force which exists in millions of animate and inanimate things in nature. 
In Buddhism, overcoming the duality of self and the world is a fundamental 
means of salvation. The concept of unity is repeatedly expressed in both Buddhist 
theories and practices. The famous Buddhist metaphor of the jewel net of Indra manifests 
this concept clearly. In this story, the interrelation of all entities in reality is explained by 
reflections among jewels. As each jewel reflects every other jewel including its reflection 
of all other jewels, every phenomenon reflects all other phenomena of reality; therefore, 
there is no clear distinction between “I” and “others.” The personal self is considered to 
be causally dependent on other phenomena. The interrelatedness of all entities is a ground 
of denying inherent nature or self in the world. Lack of independent nature in things is 
expressed as emptiness (śūnyātā) in the Mahāyāna Buddhism. The concept of emptiness, 
which is known as kū (空) or mu (無), has been very influential in the Japanese tradition 
as well. 
The founder of the Shingon sect, Kūkai, articulates the universe based on the 
story of the Indra’s net in his poem, Attaining Enlightenment in This Very Existence 
(Sokushin jōbutsu gi): 
The Six Great Elements are interfused and are in a state of eternal harmony; 
The Four Mandalas are inseparably related to one another. 
When the grace of the Three Mysteries is retained, (our inborn three mysteries 
will) quickly be manifested. 
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Infinitely interrelated like the meshes of Indra’s net are those we call existence.99 
 
In this poem, the continuity of nature and the interdependent existence of natural 
elements are expressed. According to Kūkai, all material worlds are created by the 
interaction of the Six Great Elements, which are earth, water, fire, wind, space, and 
consciousness (the Body and Mind of Dainich Nyorai (dharmakāya)); thus, Paul O. 
Ingram explains, “all phenomena are identical in their constituent self-identity.”100 
Ingram means that the Kūkai’s universe denies duality of subject and object. The 
following essay by Kūkai clearly shows his non-dualistic universe: 
Differences exist between matter and mind, but in their essential nature they 
remain the same. Matter is no other than mind; mind, no other than matter. 
Without any obstruction, they are interrelated. The subject is the object; the 
object, the subject. The seeing is the seen, and the seen is the seeing. Nothing 
differentiates them. Although we speak of the creating and the created, there is in 
reality neither the creating nor the created.101 
 
With regard to Kūkai’s world view, let me mention another important element. It 
is his recognition of the intrinsic value, or the kami nature, embodied in all sentient and 
non-sentient beings. He had a cordial and conciliatory attitude toward the Shinto 
tradition. Indeed, he contributed to the development of “Ryōbu Shinto, the Shingon form 
of the Shinto-Buddhist amalgamation.”102 The practice of meditation in mountains helped 
Kūkai to achieve a syncretistic world view based on the Shinto and Buddhism.103 This 
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convergence of religious theories is a significant contribution to Japanese nature 
aesthetics. The oneness of the world and the divine, awe-inspiring essence interwoven in 
the universe are fundamental concepts for developing the non-hierarchical, non-
anthropocentric and positive view of nature.  
The thirteenth-century Japanese Zen master Dōgen also describes non-dualistic 
reality by saying “I came to realize clearly, that mind is no other than mountains and 
rivers and the great earth.”104 In Zen Buddhism, overcoming the dichotomy of the subject 
and the object is expressed as a zero-point from which true awakening starts.105 The non-
dualistic world view is a starting point of personal salvation, indicating that the unity of 
self and the world is a fundamental element in Zen philosophy. Zen Buddhism has had 
great influence on the Japanese traditional way of art called geido. Accordingly, the 
concept of overcoming duality is present in Japanese geido by way of haiku poetry, the 
tea ceremony, Noh drama, brush paintings, and the Japanese garden. 
 
The Ever-Changing Nature 
Shizen is a common translation of the English word for nature; however, in the 
Japanese language, nature is also described as mujoh (無常), which literally means 
nothing permanent. This word reflects another important concept of the Japanese 
understanding of nature, that is, nature in flux. Mujoh began to be used under the 
influence of the Buddhist tradition. The notion of ever-changing reality is fundamental in 
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Buddhist teachings. This feature of reality is described as “impermanence (anitya)” in the 
Three Dharma Seals (Dharma mudra). Two other seals are non-self (anatman) and 
nirvana. These Three Seals are the primary concepts of all teachings of Buddha and can 
be found in any Buddhist implication.106  For example, according to the idea of 
momentariness, everything comes into being momentarily and perishes momentarily in 
that instant; therefore, things cannot become eternal. This concept implies that everything 
is impermanent. If everything is changing continuously, it lacks a permanent and self-
existing substantiality. According to this concept, nothing (無) exists in the world; 
therefore, nature is empty. Here, we can derive the notion of emptiness again. The 
emptiness of the world is supported by two concepts: the interrelatedness of entities of 
the world and their continuous change. 
Mujoh also manifests the deep melancholy of humans or life being ill or dying. 
These meanings of mujoh may lead to a misconception that the Japanese understanding 
of nature is negative. However, Tellenbach and Kimura point out that it cannot be 
understood merely in a pessimistic or nihilistic way. “Nothing permanent” is not the 
complete understanding of the notion of mujoh. We need to recognize a deeper 
implication of this term, that is, the ability to produce unpredictable phenomena. The 
essential element of mujoh is the sublime freedom and spontaneity of nature, that is, the 
force to be of itself. Therefore, shizen and mujoh manifest the same meaning in their 
essence. 
                                                           




Moreover, mujoh is not just an objective statement of nature; “the Japanese lives 
this great spontaneity of nature ‘subjectively’ as the source of his own self.”107 Ever-
changing nature is not just an objective force, but also the source of human beings; 
therefore, this concept is related to the unity of subjectivity and objectivity, which has 
been discussed in the analysis of shizen. The concept of uji proposed by Dōgen reflects 
the idea of unity based on impermanence. Time is understood as events or phenomena in 
the East Asian tradition. Change is a fundamental factor of conceiving time. According to 
this interpretation of time, time manifests the Buddhist theory of impermanence, that is, 
everything is under constant change. If our environments and we are changing 
continuously, being of self and the world are not different from time. By recognizing self 
and the world as time, Dōgen overcame the dichotomy of subject and object. 
Furthermore, the unity in light of the recognition of self and the world as time results in 
increasing ethical consciousness. Thus, as David Edward Shaner points out, Dōgen’s 
interpretation of time and existence enhances our consciousness toward environments: 
Dōgen’s concept of uji or “being-time” refers to an understanding of time that is 
informed by our intentional interaction with persons and events. When we say 
“time flies when we are having fun,” or “time stands still,” we refer to time as a 
function of our engagement with our surroundings. The fundamental point [of 
Dōgen’s concept of uji] is that awareness of time’s passing in a variety of ways is 
indicative of having cultivated a sensitivity and intersubjective relation with 
things “in time.” That is, sensitivity toward temporality itself enhances our 
experience of life. Being aware of our existence in time, our timeless as it were, 
makes life more intense and precious precisely because of our passing 
experiences.108  
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Someone may criticize that the interpretation of existence as time leads the idea that 
nothing can be protected, and can be used as a justification for the wanton exploitation of 
nature. I provide a solution to this problem in the next section. 
 
Approaches to Aesthetics Based on Theoretical Notions 
The force of becoming and impermanence were highlighted as metaphysical 
characteristics of nature by examining two Japanese words, shizen and mujoh. Both of 
these characteristics have been used as a ground of deriving the notion of unity. This fact 
indicates that being one with nature is very important in the traditional Japanese world 
view. Being aware of oneness with other things is a primary step for raising ethical 
consciousness towards them. Although, the non-dual world view is the beginning of 
personal salvation, the aim of salvation is not anthropocentric redemption but according 
oneself with the dynamically changing world. If this argument is correct, Japanese 
philosophy contains theoretical implications which raise environmental consciousness.  
A theory-oriented discussion is not sufficient to achieve a practical nature 
aesthetics; therefore, in this section, I develop practical approaches to nature aesthetics 
based on Japanese metaphysical characteristics of nature. In fact, epistemology and 
practice are not separated in the Japanese religion, especially in the Shinto and some 
Buddhist sects such as Shingon and Zen. That is, metaphysical notions go beyond the 
realm of epistemology and theory. Thus, I suppose that the metaphysical implications are 
reasonable grounds for examining Japanese aesthetic practices. 
Impermanence (Mujoh) is one of the important sources of the aesthetic 
appreciation of nature. Japanese Heian poetics portrays nature as a flux of impermanence 
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with the aesthetic notion of aware, which means the sorrow-tinged appreciation of 
transitory beauty.109 As explained in chapter one, the aesthetics of mujoh can be observed 
in the Japanese affection for cherry blossoms (sakura). Sakura is very popular among 
Japanese people not only for its beautiful appearance, but also for its nature of 
impermanence. The life of sakura is ephemeral. They fall as soon as they bloom. The 
feeling of aware is generated by observing the ephemeral life of sakura. It is true that we 
feel some sort of sorrow when we see ephemeral things; however, aware is not 
necessarily a pessimistic feeling, this feeling portraying a sensitive, deep emotion arisen 
from interacting with impermanent nature is considered to be a sources of Japanese 
nature aesthetics. 
Donald Keene points out that impermanence is one of the fundamental elements 
of Japanese aesthetics.110 He calls this feature of beauty “perishability.” The appreciation 
of perishability can be found in various forms. According to Keene, the fondness of 
wooden architecture is an example of the Japanese affection of perishability. There are 
some inevitable reasons for choosing wooden buildings. Temperature and humidity are 
very high during summer in Japan. If a house is built with stone or other strong, ill-
ventilated materials, it becomes too uncomfortable to stay there without air conditioning 
facilities. Therefore, when there was no such thing as an air conditioner, wood was the 
most suitable material for architecture. Nevertheless, it is true that Japanese people enjoy 
the perishability of wooden buildings. For example, a rustic temple of dilapidated wood 
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arouses deeper aesthetic emotions than a luxurious marble architecture. Worn materials 
are something aesthetically appreciable. 
The Japanese aesthetic notion of impermanence indicates that Japanese aesthetics 
is not based on the judgment of beauty and ugliness in light of the composition of an 
aesthetic object. Aesthetic value is recognized not in a fixed state but in the dynamic 
forces of the ephemeral world. Thus, Japanese aesthetics can be described as process-
oriented. The difference of the focus between the traditional Western and Japanese 
aesthetics is apparent. The disparity of aesthetic paradigms has affected whether nature 
could be appreciated positively. In West, permanence has been highly appreciated; thus, 
impermanent nature could not be an aesthetic object. Contrary, the Japanese aesthetic 
paradigm is common to nature aesthetics. Nature has been appreciated properly in the 
traditional Japanese aesthetics.111  
Let me move the discussion of Japanese nature aesthetics to the following 
questions: what kind of approach to nature aesthetics can be achieved by overcoming the 
dichotomy between self and the world? How does the concept of unity affect nature 
appreciation? Shaner suggests that the concept of unity (in his words, the intersubjective 
experience) is closely associated with a non-discriminating mode of consciousness.112 
This kind of consciousness can be achieved with the world view without anthropocentric 
hierarchy. When we have a hierarchical view that puts humans above nonhuman beings 
and things, we separate ourselves from the rest of the world, and thus become insensitive 
to changes of the nonhuman world. As discussed in the previous chapters, dynamic 
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changes of the world are the beauty of nature per se. That is, the anthropocentric mode of 
consciousness makes us insensitive to natural beauty as well. 
On the contrary, a non-discriminating mode of consciousness encourages us to 
think that “the world” and “we” are not different. It also enhances our interactions with 
nature. Through these intersubjective experiences, one becomes more sensitive to the 
beauty of nature. Shaner explains the possibility of an intimate relationship with nature 
arisen from a non-discriminating mode of consciousness: 
The feeling of potentiality and opportunity occasioned by intersubjective 
experiences can thus be interpreted as issuing from a nondiscriminating mode of 
consciousness. The experiences of compassion, empathy, sympathy, and love 
arise from this intersubjective experience. … the nodiscriminating mind can 
engage an intersubjective experience with  nature. The love of nature  depicted 
here is not merely directed from knowing subject to inanimate object. Rather, one 
loves nature more fully by participating in an intimate experience with the 
phenomenal world itself.113  
 
Various sorts of feelings arise from the mutual interrelationships with nature. These 
feelings are considered to be aesthetic responses in the Japanese culture. This argument 
can be explained in terms of the notion of mono no aware. 
A Shinto scholar Motoori Norinaga discusses mono no aware to illustrate a 
person’s “emotional and aesthetic experience.” The word aware in this term generally 
connotes sadness or pity. Thus, mono no aware literally means sadness (aware) in (no) 
things (mono). Nevertheless, it is not correct to limit the meaning of aware to these sorts 
of pessimistic feelings. According to Motoori, aware is an expression of deep feeling in 
the heart, any heartfelt sentiment including positive feelings such as happy, joyous, and 
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interesting.114 When one sees ephemeral aspects of nature, for example, seasonal 
changes, impermanence of life and death of being, deep emotions (aware) arise. This sort 
of emotional orientation to nature is regarded as an aesthetic response in the Japanese 
tradition. Aesthetics based on personal emotions may be misunderstood as 
anthropocentric and subjective because generally speaking, if there is no subjective 
being, an aesthetic response does not arise. However, if we go back to the starting point 
of this discussion, there is the concept of unity as a primary ground of the argument. The 
phenomenal source of an impression of beauty is in the natural process. Self can be found 
in this process as well. When we perceived natural beauty, it is not only in nature but also 
within us. Natural beauty is a part of our impermanent existence and should be enhanced 
fully. Therefore, aesthetics can be connected to an ethical consciousness. This 
characteristic of aesthetics is important for achieving nature aesthetics as an approach to 
environmental ethics. 
An important contribution of Japanese aesthetics to environmental ethics is 
providing some clues for achieving the coexistence of human culture and nature. It is 
often pointed out that aesthetic value of nature decreases if humans interfere and alter the 
natural world. The view that humans are a part of nature began to be emphasized; 
nevertheless, it is still difficult to include humans in nature completely because the idea 
that whatever we do is a part of natural processes has a potential to cause the wanton 
exploitation of nature. Thus, the separation between humans and nature still exists. This 
separation may be used as a justification for the claim that any kind of human 
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interference becomes a cause of transforming nature into artifacts. For example, the 
restoration of nature can be criticized as a destruction of natural value even though 
human manipulation is for the benefit of nonhuman natural entities.115 However, 
Japanese aesthetics is based on intersubjective experiences with non-discriminating mode 
of consciousness. In this position, the aesthetic value of nature can be achieved in terms 
of the interrelationship between subject and object. Yet, intersubjective aesthetics by no 
means allows the wanton manipulation of nature because this aesthetics accompanies 
ethical consciousness developed in light of the non-discriminating mode of consciousness 
developed from the non-dualistic world view.  
Japanese traditional art inherits this characteristic of aesthetics. Nature is 
intensively altered as a motif of art but in accord with the notions of intersubjective 
aesthetics. An example of such art is Japanese gardening. Japanese gardens are highly 
manipulated; yet, they are different from gardens achieved in light of suppressing nature 
with human control. Nature is highly appreciated in terms of human stewardship. If we 
can explicate how it is possible to achieve such human manipulation of nature, we should 
be able to justify human manipulation of nature for non-anthropocentric purposes and 
achieve the coexistence of culture and nature.  
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JAPANESE GARDENS: AN PRACTICAL APPROACH 
The tranquil atmosphere of Japanese gardens has been highly appreciated not only 
in Japan but also in Western countries. Many Japanese gardens connote religious or 
philosophical implications; yet, one can enjoy a feeling of calm in these gardens even 
without knowledge about the Japanese tradition. This quiet atmosphere partly depends on 
the monochromatic effect of the colors in the gardens. The bright colors of flowers are 
intentionally absent in Japanese gardens. The green of plants and trees is the dominant 
color, producing a simple impression in light of the subdued shades of green.  
Nevertheless, Japanese gardens are not necessarily monotonous since a rich tone scale of 
the different shades of green exists.116 The monochromatic effect brings a significant 
difference of impressions between Japanese and Western gardens. One may be able to 
feel calm without difficulty because of this effect. However, the monochrome is not 
sufficient to describe unique qualities of Japanese gardens. 
Carlson focuses on the aesthetic features of Japanese gardens, specifically tea and 
stroll gardens, and discusses how these gardens can be aesthetically appreciated without 
difficulty in spite of their foundation based on a dialectical relationship between art and 
nature.117 As previously mentioned, art and nature depend on different aesthetic 
paradigms. When someone makes an aesthetic judgment about art, he or she views an 
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artwork in terms of its correct category and makes critical judgments based on its design. 
On the other hand, according to Carlson’s account, nature should be aesthetically viewed 
in light of order appreciation, which can be developed in terms of proper information 
about geological and biological forces. However, when art and nature are combined, as in 
the case of gardening, people often find it difficult to engage in aesthetic appreciation 
because of conflicts in their aesthetic paradigms. This is particularly true with regard to 
gardens that exemplify, what Donald W. Crawford calls, a dialectical relationship 
between art and nature. In such a relationship, the artificial and the natural are conflicting 
forces, which sometimes synthesize a new object of aesthetic appreciation as a result of 
their interaction. Because the emerged third object may be unique, its aesthetic 
appreciation is different from either the standpoint of artificial or natural beauty.118 
Carlson claims that Japanese gardens are an example of such gardens; nevertheless, one 
seldom has difficulties when appreciating Japanese gardens. Thus, there is a paradox in 
the aesthetic appreciation of Japanese gardens. 
As a solution to this paradox, Carlson argues that Japanese gardens avoid critical 
judgment, which is essential in the appreciation of art, in terms of their appearances of 
“natural inevitability.”119 In other words, they appear as they should be, that is, as they 
could not have been otherwise, thus, making it impossible to judge them critically. Such 
gardens achieve this kind of look by disclosing the essence of nature. Carlson explains: 
I suggest that the key to achieving the relevant kind of look is a kind of 
idealization aimed at isolating and revealing the essential. In short, the solution to 
the problem of judgment lies in the fact that Japanese gardens achieve a look of 
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inevitability not by the creation of a simple copy of nature, but rather by the 
creation of an idealization of nature that attempts to uncover what are taken to be 
its essential qualities.120 
 
One may think that such ideas as the appearance of natural inevitability, the idealization 
of nature, and essential qualities of nature are similar to Platonic universal concepts. In 
other words, if Japanese gardens are appearances of what ought to be, such appearances 
may be regarded as the perfect forms of the gardens. However, if this interpretation is 
correct, the aesthetic features of Japanese gardens do not accord with Eastern thought, 
which denies universal concepts of the world. Therefore, it is necessary to consider the 
following questions in order to understand the aesthetic paradigms of Japanese gardens: 
what are essential qualities of nature, and how can we achieve the disclosure of the 
essence of nature?  
First, I explore the concept of the essence of nature in Japanese gardens. The 
general definition of essence is the intrinsic properties which characterize the nature of an 
object. Essence is a quality which helps us conceptualize things in the world. Thus, the 
natural essence is the manifestation of the fundamental characteristics of nature. An 
examination of Japanese notions of nature provides some clues to elucidating the concept 
of the essence of nature in Japan; thus, it is meaningful to reconsider the discussion of 
these notions, which was developed in the previous chapter.  
In the etymological analysis of the Japanese words for nature, at least, three 
metaphysical notions of nature were disclosed: the force of becoming of nature, the 
impermanence of nature, and the unity of subject and object. The spontaneity and the 
impermanency of nature have been positively appreciated in the Japanese tradition, and 
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have worked as a basis for the non-dualistic view of the world. Besides these notions, 
irregularity in nature (i.e., incompleteness and asymmetry) is also aesthetically 
appreciated in the Japanese tradition.121 If such characteristics as spontaneity, 
impermanency, and irregularity are truly essential features of nature, it is reasonable to 
state that Japanese gardening is based on expressing these characteristics in light of 
human manipulation, such as the pruning of trees and the arranging of objects, and also 
on achieving the oneness of subject and object through these notions.  
If this supposition is correct, why then is human manipulation necessary for 
extracting these characteristics? Does the essence of nature not appear without 
artifactualizing natural landscapes or objects? Assuming that the intensive treatment of 
nature plays a significant role in disclosing the natural essence, how can we achieve this 
disclosure without turning nature into a mere artifact? For answers to these questions, let 
me focus on the relationship of climate and art discussed by the twentieth-century 
Japanese philosopher, Watsuji Tetsuro. In his book, Climate and Culture: A 
Philosophical Study, Watsuji describes how climatic patterns have influenced the 
construction of human cultures.122 Depending on climate, our physical and mental 
reactions to environments differ; thus, according to Watsuji, human views and senses, 
which consist of cultural and historical structures, need to be examined in light of 
climatic conditions. Perhaps the relationship between climate and culture is reciprocal. 
Nature speaks to us in light of climate and we develop a certain consciousness. 
Simultaneously, we see nature through different filters of that consciousness and in doing 
                                                           
121 The fondness for irregularity is discussed in chapter one in this essay. 
122 Watsuji Tetsurō, Climate and Culture: A Philosophical Study, trans. Geoffrey Bownas (New 
York: Greenwood Press, 1961).  
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so recognize different features in nature. Art including gardening is a human activity; 
accordingly, we should not neglect climatic characteristics when discussing aesthetics 
preferences. 
Watsuji classifies the climate in Japan as a monsoon type, which is characterized 
by high temperature and high humidity. In addition to these monsoon characteristics, 
significant seasonal change, combining the feature of a tropical zone and that of a frigid 
zone, is distinctive to Japanese climate. The significant change of climate is not only 
temporal but also spatial. Because of the complexity of geographical features, different 
climatic conditions can be observed concurrently. Under the influence of these temporal 
and spatial changes, distinctive Japanese consciousness has developed.123 Through this 
filter of consciousness, Japanese people see the world and engage in cultural activities. 
Therefore, it is possible to suppose that climatic conditions are associated with the 
creation and the appreciation of gardens. 
In order to clarify the relationship between climate and gardening, it is useful to 
compare the style of English and Japanese gardens. English-style natural gardens are 
framed, less artifactualized landscapes. Unlike highly manipulated gardens, natural 
objects are appreciated in light of their natural shapes. In such gardens, as Carlson 
explains, harmonious relationships are achieved by nature serving as a model for art.124 
                                                           
123 Because of high humidity, the productivity of nature is significant; thus, people tend to be 
passive toward nature. That is, they do not develop antagonistic attitudes toward nature. Nevertheless, 
nature also brings such disasters as floods. These climatic catastrophes are so violent that people have 
learned resignation. Moreover, since seasonal change is significant, they obtained high sensitivity toward 
changes in nature. Under the influence of these climatic conditions, the distinctive Japanese way of life has 
been developed to be “a copious outflow of emotion, constantly changing, yet conceals perseverance 
beneath this change; at every moment in this alteration of mutability and endurance, there is abruptness.” 
For a detailed discussion about the monsoon type climate and its historical and cultural characteristics, see 
Ibid., pp. 18–39, and pp. 133–138. 
124 Carlson, Aesthetics and the Environment, p. 165. 
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This look can be achieved in the mild climate in Europe. Under such a climate, natural 
entities can be artistic objects without the intensive labor of pruning. To the contrary, in 
Japan, because nature appears “disorderly and desolate confusion,”125 intensive care is 
required to maintain natural objects as entities of art in gardens. The highly 
artifactualization of nature in Japanese gardens is partly because of climatic conditions. 
Nevertheless, Japanese gardens are different from Western formal gardens, which also 
depend on intense manipulation of nature. In what ways are Japanese and Western formal 
gardens different? Watsuji provides a clue to this question in terms of the distinctive 
idealization of nature in Japanese gardens: 
The putting some artificial order into the natural could not be achieved by 
covering up the natural by the artificial, but only by making the artificial follow 
the natural. And by the nursing of the natural by the artificial, the natural is, all 
the more, made to follow from within…. Thus the Japanese discovered a purely 
natural form within the disorder and wilderness of nature and this is what is 
reproduced in their garden. In this sense, the Japanese garden is indeed a 
refinement and an idealization of natural beauty.126  
 
In Western formal gardens, the natural is suppressed by the artificial. This task can be 
achieved by altering nature in accordance with geometric proportion and mathematical 
principles. On the other hand, this sort of composition of natural entities is avoided in the 
creation of Japanese gardens. In such gardens, nature is altered by making the artificial 
follow the natural. How, then, is this alteration of nature achieved?  
As a specific example, let us focus on the treatment of moss in Japanese gardens. 
The moss covering the entire surface of the garden is artificially achieved by tending. 
Since the moss does not grow impartially over the surface, this kind of look cannot be 
                                                           
125 Watsuji, Climate and Culture, p. 190. 




achieved without human manipulation. Nevertheless, it is different from a flat green 
surface of turf, which can be seen in most Western gardens. The moss in Japanese 
gardens has an undulation that wells subtly from below, and this undulation is not 
artificial but natural.127 The undulation represents the subtle difference in the length or 
intensity of the moss, which is a result of the spontaneity of nature; thus, in light of 
appreciating the natural undulation of the moss, the spontaneous life force of nature is 
aesthetically appreciated in Japanese gardens. Beauty is not produced as a result of 
artifactualization of nature in this gardening. This sort of tending is an example of the 
artificial following the natural.  
A unity in a composition of Western formal gardens is geometrical, mathematical, 
and sometimes symmetrical. Natural objects are altered and arranged in accordance with 
these principles. On the other hand, a unity is gained by, what Watsuji calls, “a meeting 
of spirit” in Japanese gardens.128 He mentions that spirits meet among natural objects, for 
example, between moss and stone, or between stone and stone, if these objects are 
arranged successfully in light of the Japanese composition of gardens. This sort of 
animistic unity is not seen in Western gardening; thus, it may sound strange to alter or to 
arrange objects in accordance with their spirits. Nevertheless, if Watsuji’s suggestion is 
correct, this unique animistic composition has been pursued even in Buddhist gardening, 
notwithstanding that Buddhism originally does not accept the animistic view of the 
world. In terms of the significant influence of Shinto on the Japanese tradition, animism 
has been important in the Japanese world view. Thus, it plays an important role even in 
                                                           
127 Ibid., p. 191. 




the creation of Japanese gardens. Interestingly, this distinctive way of achieving a unity 
seems to work as a basis for realizing such Japanese notions of the world as 
“impermanence,” “irregularity,” and “the oneness with nature.” 
Geometrical and mathematical principles in Western formal gardens are uniform. 
Natural objects which are arranged in accordance with these principles have fixed states 
or forms. The concept of time is denied in these gardens. Japanese informal gardens, on 
the other hand, manifest both temporal and spatial changes.129 A unity achieved through a 
meeting of spirit does not bind natural objects in immutable or geometrical forms; thus, 
impermanent and irregular qualities of natural objects are intrinsically appreciated 
without difficulty. Indeed, impermanence is a fundamental element in the creation of 
Japanese gardens in that seasonal changes are not simply allowed rather they are 
necessary for the creation of superior-class gardens.130 Moreover, this unification 
encourages the appreciation of the irregularity of objects. Thus, objects in Japanese 
gardens are intentionally arranged in irregular patterns.  For example, rocks are arranged 
in incomplete broken zigzag lines. Those arranged in straight lines are considered 
aesthetically inferior in the art of Japanese gardening. This sort of irregular arrangement 
of objects is achieved not by geometrical principles but in light of refined feeling.131 
Since a meeting of spirit is not mathematical, the achievement of this task 
depends on intuitive principles gained through overcoming the dichotomy between self 
and the world. If there is a separation between subject and object, it is not possible to 
                                                           
129 Mara Miller, The Garden as an Art (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1993), pp. 
22–24. 
130 Watsuji, Climate and Culture, p. 193. 




arrange objects in light of their spirits. In terms of being one with nature, people realize 
the tension among natural objects and create gardens in accordance with it. This 
suggestion is justifiable because Japanese gardens, especially tea and stroll gardens, are 
significantly influenced by Zen Buddhism, which holds the view that the non-dualistic 
world view is a starting point of personal meditation.  
There are various styles of Japanese gardens and each of them requires different 
aesthetic paradigms. But at least with regard to tea and stroll gardens, if my examination 
of these gardens is correct, their creation in light of the idealization of nature and the 
extraction of the natural essence is connected to such notions of nature as impermanence, 
the force of becoming, and irregularity. Furthermore, it is also suggested that the unity of 
self and the world is fundamental in the creation of the gardens. As previously explained, 
these notions work as the basis for the process-oriented appreciation of nature, and thus, 
accord with the paradigms of nature aesthetics. Since there are commonalities in aesthetic 
paradigms of Japanese gardens and of nature, it is possible to educate nature aesthetics in 
light of the creation and the appreciation of Japanese gardens. Because of increasing 
public interest in Japanese gardens, these gardens may be one of the promising ways to 
introduce the concepts of nature aesthetics to the public, and eventually alter our attitudes 
toward the natural world. 
The implications of Japanese gardening may present approaches to ecological 
restoration. The restoration of nature is problematic since human interference can be 
considered to be the cause of decreases in such natural values as historical value and 
aesthetic value. Such criticism against restoration is mainly to counter claims that 
encourage the exploitation of nature by making it appear that landscapes which have been 
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destroyed through exploitation can be easily restored to their original condition. It is 
correct that we should neither intervene in nature unnecessarily for the benefit of humans 
nor justify the wanton use of nature on the basis of claims about the ability of restoration 
to replace the devastated areas. However, the rejection of restoration denies the 
coexistence of culture and nature and the possibility of creating better environments for 
both human and nonhuman beings. As I have shown in this chapter, Japanese gardens are 
intensely manipulated by humans. Nevertheless, this manipulation does not seem to 
decrease their natural aesthetic value. If it is correct that this human interference can be 
achieved in terms of the extraction of such natural characteristics as impermanence, 
spontaneity, and irregularity, and the non-dualistic world view between humans and 
nature, we may be able to find some clues to justifying ecological restoration from these 
aesthetic characteristics of Japanese gardening. I think it is reasonable to mention, at 
least, the following two points. First, aesthetic value can be increased in light of the 
interaction between humans and nature by restoring environments. In contrast, the 
separation of human culture from the natural world (Elliot’s position) decreases the 
aesthetic value of nature. Accordingly, restoration can enhance aesthetic value of nature. 
Second, restoration has to be done in light of a non-discriminating mode of 
consciousness. It should not become a justification for anthropocentric exploitation of 
nature. The restoration of environments may have benefit for humans; yet, its main 
concern should not be anthropocentric. 
I have specifically focused on the Japanese tradition as a solution to the problem 
of nature aesthetics in this essay. Indeed, many useful implications for nature 
appreciation are disclosed through the examination of this tradition. However, my 
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suggestion is not that the Japanese tradition should work as a universal ground for 
environmental ethics, or that people in Western countries should follow the Japanese way 
of seeing nature. Rather, my intent in this essay has been to introduce one of many 
practical approaches to nature aesthetics, and to argue that it is possible to raise aesthetic 
consciousness toward nature not only in light of scientific information but also in light of 
an unscientific view of nature. Nature aesthetics developed in the context of science tends 
to be Western oriented because of the close association between science and Western 
culture. Different approaches are necessary in order to expand the possibility of nature 
aesthetics. I believe that the study of the Japanese tradition introduces a new approach to 
nature aesthetics.  
If I emphasize the ecological implications in the Japanese tradition, one may think 
that Japan has achieved nature aesthetics in terms of its traditional culture. Unfortunately, 
industrialized Japan is one of the major countries responsible for current environmental 
degradation. In spite of the potential ecological aspects in the tradition, Japan has been 
following a path toward a technology-oriented, nontraditional way of life. Thus, I hope 
that this study becomes an opportunity for Japanese people to look their traditional 
culture again with new insights, and to achieve a meeting of Western and Eastern 
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